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Recent Development
INSURANCE LAW-ASBESTOS-RELATED DISEASES TRIGGER INSURER'S
DUTY TO DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY WHEN THE DISEASES
BECOME REASONABLY CAPABLE OF MEDICAL
DIAGNOSIS
Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (1st Cir. 1982)
Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. (Eagle-Picher) is a manufacturer of indus-
trial insulation products containing asbestos.' Since the late 1960's, Eagle-
Picher has been named as a defendant in approximately 5,500 lawsuits by
plaintiffs who allege injuries or death from exposure to, and ingestion of,
asbestos fibers from Eagle-Picher's products.2
From 1968 through 1980 Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (Liberty Mu-
tual) provided Eagle-Picher with primary comprehensive general liability
(CGL)3 insurance for protection against adverse products liability judg-
1. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.
1982),cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1279, 1280 (1983). Eagle-Picher is a diversified industrial
manufacturer whose sales of products containing asbestos never exceeded one-half of
one percent of their annual sales. Brief for Appellants, Eagle-Picher at 6 & n.6, Ea-
gle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982). After
approximately forty years of manufacturing insulation products which contained as-
bestos, Eagle-Picher virtually ceased production of these materials in 1971. Brief for
Appellees, The Manifestation Companies and Underwriters in the London Market at
8, Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 12.
2. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. 110, 111
(D. Mass. 1981). For a discussion of the increasing number of asbestos-related law-
suits brought against Eagle-Picher, see note 13 and accompanying text infra. In the
suits against Eagle-Picher, plaintiffs seek damages for personal injury or wrongful
death. Plaintiffs allege that ingestion or inhalation of asbestos fibers from Eagle-
Picher products, accompanied by inadequate warnings from Eagle-Picher regarding
the hazards of working with asbestos caused individuals working with Eagle-Picher
products to contract one or more asbestos-related diseases-asbestosis, mesothelioma,
or branchogenic carcinoma. Brief for Appellees, The Manifestation Companies and
Underwriters in the London Market at 9, Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982).
These personal injury actions underly the insurance issue which is in dispute in Eagle-
Picher and will be referred to as the "underlying claims." For a general description of
three of the underlying claims against Eagle-Picher which are at the heart of the
insurance controversy, see 682 F.2d at 21-22 n.7.
3. 682 F.2d at 16-17. Under standard CGL policies, the insurer essentially
agrees to pay on behalf of an insured such damages which result from "bodily injury"
caused by an "occurrence" during the policy period. See 682 F.2d at 17. Liberty
Mutual issued primary CGL insurance policies to Eagle-Picher from January 1, 1968
to January 1, 1980. Id. at 16-17. The fourteen separate policies issued by Liberty
Mutual during this period contained no more than two variations of each relevant
clause. Eagle-Picher, 523 F. Supp. at 112. During the period from 1968 to 1976, the
policies provided in pertinent part as follows: "The Company will pay on behalf of
the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obliged to pay as dam-
(1335)
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ments.4 First layer excess insurance coverage, which would go into effect
only if the policy limits of the underlying primary coverage became ex-
hausted, 5 was provided by American Motorists Insurance Co. (American
ages because of. . .bodily injury . . .to which this policy applies, caused by an
occurrence. . . ." Id From 1976 to 1978 the phrase "because of bodily injury due
to asbestos exposure caused by an occurrence if the bodily injury is included within
the products hazard," was substituted for the "because" clause of the earlier policy.
Id
The Liberty Mutual policies had originally defined "occurrence" as "an acci-
dent, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results, during
the policy period, in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended
from the standpoint of the insured." Id In subsequent policies the words "during
the policy period" were eliminated from the definition of "occurrence" and were
added to the definition of "bodily injury." Id "Bodily injury" in Liberty Mutual's
policies had been defined as "bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by any per-
son." Id. Subsequent policies, however, added to this definition of "bodily injury,"
the clause "which occurs during the policy period, including death at any time result-
ing therefrom." Id
4. Id The advance premium for the Liberty Mutual CGL policies and the lim-
its of liability varied from policy period to policy period as follows:
Policy Period Premium Limits of Liability
1/1/68 - 1/1/69 $8,807 (advance) $100,000 (each person)
$300,000 (each occurrence)
$300,000 (aggregate)
1/1/73 - 1/1/74 69,229 (annual) $500,000 (each occurrence)
$500,000 (aggregate)
1/1/74- 1/1/75 74,903 $500,000 (each occurrence)
(undiscounted $500,000 (aggregate)
annual)
1/75 - 1/76 130,151 $500,000 (each occurrence)
(undiscounted $500,000 (aggregate)
annual)
1/1/77 - 1/1/78 210,000 (estimated $1,000,000 (each occurrence)
annual) $1,000,000 (aggregate)
500,000
(maximum
annual)
See Brief for Appellant, American Motorists Ins. Co. at 6-8, Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at
12.
5. 682 F.2d at 17. It has been industry practice to spread coverage among nu-
merous carriers so that in most cases insurance companies all reinsure one another.
Brief for Amicus Curiae, Commercial Union Ins. Cos. at 20, Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at
12. See Mansfield, Asbestos." The Cases and the Insurance Problem, 15 Forum 860, 877
(Summer 1980) (it is common practice for insurers to participate in large pools of
excess insurance for major manufacturers). For example, in 1973-74, Eagle-Picher
paid a premium of $34,100 to American Motorists for first layer excess insurance
coverage. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, American Motorists, Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d
12 (1st Cir. 1982). This policy extended Eagle-Picher's coverage from $500,000
under Liberty Mutual's policy to $5,500,000 under both policies. Id. However, the
terms of the American Motorists policies provided that the five million dollar limit
would not go into effect until the $500,000 limit of the underlying Liberty Mutual
policy was completely exhausted. See 682 F.2d at 17. For a discussion of the various
policy limits, see note 4 supra.
1336 [Vol. 28: p. 1335
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Motorists) between June 1973 and October 1975,6 and by a group of British
underwriters (the London Market) from October 1975 through January 1,
1979. 7 The London Market also provided Eagle-Picher with second layer
excess coverage from September 1973 until January 1, 1979.8
In 1977, Liberty Mutual, Eagle-Picher's primary insurer, claimed that
its policy limits for 1974 and 1975 were about to be reached. 9 In response,
American Motorists contended that Liberty Mutual had misconstrued the
terms of its policies, and had caused a premature claim of exhaustion of its
primary insurance coverage.10 The London Market responded by sending a
reservation of rights letter to Eagle-Picher, pending resolution of the correct
6. 682 F.2d at 17. The American Motorists policy provided that "[tihe Com-
pany agrees to indemnify the insured for all sums which the insured shall become
obligated to pay as damages, by reason of liability ...because of personal injury
* . . caused by or arising out of an occurrence which takes place during the policy
period anywhere in the world." 523 F. Supp. at 113.
The definitions contained in the policies provided in pertinent part as follows:
"Personal inju means (a) bodily injury, shock, sickness or disease . .. Occurrence
means an accident, or a continuous or repeated exposure to conditions which results,
during the policy period, in personal injury.
Id
7. 682 F.2d at 17. The language of the London Market policies in effect from
October 10, 1975 to January 1, 1979 parallels that of the American Motorists policy
except that in defining the term "occurrence," the London Market policies added
that "all such exposure to substantially the same general conditions existing at or
emanating from one premises shall be deemed one occurrence." Brief for Defendant-
Appellant, American Motorists at 9-10, Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 12 (1st Cir. 1982).
Other insurance companies also provided Eagle-Picher with first-layer excess cover-
age between 1968 and 1973, and additional umbrella coverage between 1973 and
1979. However, they were not parties to the declaratory judgment action. 682 F.2d
at 16 n.1.
8. 682 F.2d at 17. The coverage provided by the second layer of excess insur-
ance goes into effect only if the policy limits of the first excess layer have become
exhausted. Id. ; 523 F. Supp. at 112. In Eagle-Picher, the second layer of excess cover-
age consisted of many short-term policies, typically covering one year at a time,
which were issued by various underwriters in the London Market. See Eagle-Picher,
523 F. Supp. at 113. For a graphic representation of the coverage scheme in Eagle-
Picher, see id at 119. There were three second-layer excess umbrella policies issued
by the London Market covering the period from September 1973 to January 1, 1979.
Brief for Appellant, American Motorists at 10, Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir.
1982). The second layer policies contained no independent coverage clauses or defi-
nitions. Eagle-Picher, 523 F. Supp. at 113. Instead, these policies incorporated by
reference the terms of the underlying policy, stating that indemnification would be
provided for damages "caused by or arising out of each occurrence happening any-
where in the world, and aristng out of the hazards covered by and as defined 'n the underlying
Umbrella pohctes . . . ." Brief for Appellant, American Motorists at 10, Eagle-Picher,
682 F.2d at 12 (emphasis in original); Eagle-Picker, 523 F. Supp. at 113.
9. 682 F.2d at 15. Liberty Mutual had sent notice to Eagle-Picher that its 1974
and 1975 insurance policy limits were about to be reached. Id. Eagle-Picher then
forwarded this notice to its excess insurers, American Motorists and the London Mar-
ket. Id.
10. Id. American Motorists disagreed with Liberty Mutual's practice of han-
dling claims as though Liberty Mutual's liability had been triggered by the manifes-
tation of asbestos-related injuries. See Eagle-Picher, 523 F. Supp. at 112.
1982-83] 1337
3
Levy: Insurance Law - Asbestos-Related Diseases Trigger Insurer's Duty
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1983
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
theory of insurability.1 I
In 1978, Eagle-Picher sought declaratory relief in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Massachusetts 2 to determine the obli-
gation of its various insurers to defend and indemnify it in the numerous
lawsuits arising out of exposure to its asbestos products.1 3 The central issue
which faced the district court in the declaratory judgment action was
whether insurance coverage was to be triggered when a claimant was ex-
posed to material containing asbestos or when the asbestos-related disease
first manifested itself.14 The district court concluded that coverage under
the applicable policies would be triggered by the date of medical diagnosis of
an asbestos-related disease, or at death, if no prior diagnosis has been
made. 15 On appeal, 16 the United States Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
11. 682 F.2d at 15-16. This letter held in abeyance all rights under the insur-
ance policies issued by the London Market while there was a genuine controversy
between the insurers regarding defendant's duties and obligations under their respec-
tive policies in connection with the underlying asbestos-related claims. Eagle-Picher,
523 F. Supp. at 112. The reservation of rights letter appears to have been a catalyst
in Eagle-Picher's subsequent commencement of the declaratory judgment action. See
682 F.2d at 16.
12. Eagle-Richer, 523 F. Supp. at 111. Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citi-
zenship. See id. at 112. For the purposes of this declaratory judgment action, Eagle-
Picher was considered to be uninsured prior to 1968. 682 F.2d at 16. This conclusion
was apparently reached because there was no evidence adduced of any insurance in
effect for asbestos-related claims filed against Eagle-Picher prior to 1968. Brief for
the Appellee, Eagle-Picher at 4, 4 n.3, Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 12.
13. Eagle-Richer, 523 F. Supp. at 111. When Eagle-Picher commenced its declar-
atory judgment action in September, 1978, there were approximately 900 claims
against them. Brief for the Appellant, Eagle-Picher at 6, Eagle-Richer, 682 F.2d at 12.
There were 5,500 outstanding claims at the time of trial and more than 11,000 by the
end of 1981; the claims against Eagle-Picher continue to be filed at the rate of almost
500 per month. Id at 6-7. For a discussion of the explosion of claims against the
asbestos industry as a whole, see note 27 and accompanying text infra.
14. Eagle-Picher, 523 F. Supp. at 111. Eagle-Picher, Liberty Mutual and some
London underwriters known as the "Bird" defendants argued to the court that liabil-
ity should be triggered by the manifestation of medically diagnosable symptoms of
asbestos-related disease, while American Motorists and other London Market under-
writers referred to as the "Froude" defendants claimed that an insurer's liability is
triggered when the claimant is initially exposed to asbestos fibers. Id
15. Id at 118. To aid it in the interpretation of the relevant policy language,
the district court received medical testimony from two doctors specializing in the
area of asbestos-related disease. Id. at 115. The court ruled that the manifestation
theory of interpretation was meritorious, basing its decision on three grounds: 1) the
medical evidence adduced at trial; 2) the legal principle that contract terms are to be
accorded their common, popular and ordinary meaning; and 3) the public policy
dictating construction of contracts to promote coverage of the insured. See td. at 115-
18. The district court further supported its conclusion by stating that a manifestation
approach most closely approximated the expectations of the contracting parties. Id
at 118. The court reasoned that the date of medical diagnosis is to be deemed the
date of manifestation since that point in time is more easily ascertained by demon-
strable evidence. See id.
16. 682 F.2d at 12. The defendant-proponents of the exposure theory appealed,
alleging that the district court erred by excluding extrinsic evidence of Eagle-Picher's
intent in entering into the insurance contracts. Id. at 16. Appellant had also argued
1338 [Vol. 28: p. 1335
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cuit1 7 affirmed and modified the lower court's opinion, holding that the oper-
ative date for determining insurance liability is the date on which the
asbestos-related disease becomes reasonably capable of medical diagnosis.
Eagle-Richer Industries, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir.
1982).
Asbestos is a fibrous mineral'1 in great demand in industry for its heat-
that declaratory relief should be denied because (1) there was no case or controversy
between Eagle-Picher and Liberty Mutual and therefore, that Liberty Mutual
should have been dismissed from the action; and (2) Eagle-Picher had failed to join
additional insurers to the action. Id. at 16 n.1. However, these arguments were re-
jected by the First Circuit. Id.
Eagle-Picher cross-appealed, arguing for the first time that all policies in force
from the time of initial exposure, including those in effect at the time of manifesta-
tion, are triggered by an asbestos claim. Id at 23 (citing Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of
N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982)). Eagle-
Picher further asserted that the district court had erred in choosing the date of actual
medical diagnosis as the date of manifestation. Id. at 24.
Four amicus briefs were filed with the First Circuit. One supported the "mani-
festation theory," another the "exposure theory." Brief for Amici Curiae, Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co., et al, at 1, Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d 12 (manifestation theory); Brief for
Amici Curiae, American Home Assurance Co., et al, at 13, Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d 12
(exposure theory). A third amicus brief was filed in support of the "continuous injury
construction" interpretation which the District of Columbia Circuit has espoused,
while the fourth brief supported a non-judicial compensation plan. Brief for Amicus
Curiae, Armstrong World Indus., Inc. at 25, Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d 12 (citing Keene
Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 1007 (1982)) (continuous injury theory); Brief for Amicus Curiae, Commercial
Union Ins. Cos. at 27, Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d 12 (non-judicial compensation plan).
17. The case was heard by Chief Judge Coffin and Judges Campbell and Bown-
es. 682 F.2d at 15. The opinion of the court was written by Chief Judge Coffin. Id.
18. Mansfield, supra note 5, at 860; Mehaffy, Asbestos-Related Lung Dzsease, 16
FORUM 341, 342 (Winter 1980). The term "asbestos" is derived from a Greek word
meaning "inextinguishable, unquenchable or inconsumable." Mansfield, supra, at
860. See also WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 126 (3d ed.
1971) ("inextinguishable, unextinguished").
Chrysotile, crocidolite, and amosite are the three varieties of asbestos which are
commercially significant. Mansfield, supra note 5, at 860. Although every commer-
cial variety of asbestos has been found to produce significant health hazards to per-
sons exposed to the fibers, medical studies have indicated that amosite and crocidolite
are potentially more hazardous to health than chrysolite. See Comment, Asbestos Lzti-
gation. The Dust Has Yet to Settle, 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 55, 58 (1978). See also Mans-
field, supra note 5, at 860. The acid-resistant property of crocidolite and amosite
fibers makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the human body to break down these
fibers through the secretion of acid-like enzymes. See Eagle-Picher, 523 F. Supp. at
115. Crocidolite is a material used during World War II in the filtering element of
gas-mask containers. Mansfield, supra note 5, at 861. Since crocidolite is the least
acid-resistant strain of the asbestos family, and since production of crocidolite ac-
counts for the increase in asbestos production during World War II and shortly there-
after, it may have contributed to the tremendous number of disease-related claims
brought in the 1970's by those exposed to asbestos products in the 1940's and 1950's.
See Mansfield, supra note 5, at 861. Chrysolite, which now accounts for approxi-
mately 97% of the asbestos used annually in the United States, is apparently more
readily attacked by acids, making it less immune to the natural defenses of the
human body. See id. at 860.
1982-831 1339
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resistant and insulating properties. 19 The inhalation of asbestos fibers,
which may be released into the air when the mineral is mined, processed,
and applied, or destroyed in the course of a construction project, 20 may re-
sult in respiratory or pulmonary injury, diseases of the cardiovascular system
or various cancers. 21 Further, since the effects of the inhalation of asbestos
are thought to be both time and dose-related, 22 it is persons who are continu-
19. Mansfield, supra note 5, at 861. There are possibly as many as 3,000 differ-
ent products containing some asbestos in daily use throughout the world, ranging
from toothbrushes to asphalt roofing shingles. Id. It has been suggested that as a fire
and heat-resistant ingredient, there is no other material available at a reasonable
price which is as effective as asbestos in excessive heat-related applications. Mehaffy,
supra note 18, at 342. See also Mansfield, supra 5, at 861.
20. Ingram, Insurance Coverage Problems in Latent Disease and Inj'u Cases, 12
ENVTL. L. 317, 319 (1982). The primary use of asbestos in the construction industry
is for insulation. Id at 319. The material was used most extensively in the insulation
of large ocean-going vessels during World War II. Vagley & Blanton, Aggregation of
Claims: Liability for Certain Illnesses with Long Latency Periods Before Manifestation, 16
FORUM 636, 637 (Spring 1981). However, asbestos is or has also been used in ce-
ments, asphalts, wallboard, plastics, shingles, paints and even in automobile brake
linings and clutch facings. Ingram, supra, at 319. Thus, the implication that workers
in the construction industry may be at primary risk of asbestos-related disease encom-
passes not only those engaged in the construction of buildings, but also those engaged
in the construction of roads and automobiles. See id.
21. Ingram, supra note 20, at 320. First, scarring of the lungs, resulting from the
inhalation of sufficient quantities of asbestos particles, may lead to a condition typi-
fied by an inelasticity of the lungs. Id. at 320-21. This irreversible and progressive
disease is known as asbestosis. Id Studies have shown that the longer a person has
been exposed to asbestos, the more likely it is that he will contract asbestosis. See
Mansfield, supra note 5, at 861. For a more detailed discussion of the correlation
between exposure to asbestos and asbestos-related disease, see notes 22 and 26 and
accompanying text infra. Fibrosis of the lung tissue may lead to a hypertension of the
pulmonary system resulting in an overwhelming strain to the right ventricle of the
heart and subsequent coronary failure. Ingram, supra note 20, at 320-21.
Second, exposure to asbestos may also lead to cancer of the lung or gastrointesti-
nal tract. Comment, Relieffor Asbestos Victims: A Legislative Analysis, 20 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 179, 180-81 (1983).
Third, exposure to asbestos has also been implicated in the development of
mesothelioma, which is a cancer characterized by tumors of the lung membrane.
Ingram, supra note 20, at 321. Unlike the development of asbestosis, however, there
has been no proven correlation between length of exposure to asbestos and increased
risk of contracting mesothelioma. Id With mesothelioma, the length of time be-
tween the first exposure to asbestos and the development of a tumor can range from
three and one-half years to a maximum of seventy-three years. Id. at 321-22.
22. Mansfield, supra note 5, at 861; Mehaffy, supra note 18, at 346. This gener-
ally means "that asbestos-related diseases may develop only after the inhalation of
substantial amounts of asbestos dust over a substantial period of time." Mansfield,
supra note 5, at 861. For example, major studies have concluded that asbestos insula-
tion workers with more than 40 years experience exhibit a 90% higher incidence of
abnormality than those with less than 10 years experience. See Borel v. Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1084-85 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869
(1974) (citation omitted).
For examples of cases where worker-plaintiffs have been exposed to asbestos for a
considerable period of time prior to developing asbestos-related disease, see Clutter v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 646 F.2d 1151 (6th Cir. 1981) (asbestos insulation
mechanic exposed from 1939-1973); Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523
6
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ously exposed to asbestos in an occupational setting who are at the greatest
risk of being affected with an asbestos-related disease.23
Despite the fact that asbestos has been widely-used for centuries, 24 the
possible injurious effects from exposure to asbestos particles were not identi-
fied until the middle of the twentieth century.2 5 An increased awareness of a
F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1975) (insulation worker exposed from 1948-1966); Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
869 (1974) (insulation worker exposed from 1936-1969); Locke v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 221 Va. 951, 275 S.E.2d 900 (1981) (industrial electrician exposed from 1948-
1972). For a more detailed discussion of the claims plaintiffs have brought against
Eagle-Picher, see note 2 supra.
23. Mansfield, supra note 5, at 861. For a discussion of the occupational hazards
of working with asbestos in the construction industry, see note 20 supra. It has been
stated that over the next 30 to 35 years, an estimated 1 million to 2 million American
workers will die from diseases caused by exposure to asbestos in the workplace. See
Comment, supra note 21, at 179. One author has noted that asbestos-related disease
may be contracted not only by members of the construction, insulation, and ship-
building industries, but also by others working with asbestos, such as garage mechan-
ics and maintenance employees. See Comment, supra note 18, at 58 & n.25. While
those working with asbestos are more likely to contract an asbestos-caused disease,
environmental exposure to asbestos has also been shown to cause disease. Id at 62.
But see Mansfield, supra, at 862 (there is presently no evidence of risk to the general
public from exposure to minute amounts of asbestos particles). For example, "neigh-
borhood exposure"-exposure through residence near an asbestos factory-may
cause the development of an asbestos-related disease. Comment, supra note 18, at 62.
Asbestos-related diseases have also occurred among those living in the household of
an asbestos worker. Id. For a study of the effects of household exposure, see Ander-
son, Household Contact Asbestos Neoplastic Risk, 271 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 311 (1976).
24. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083 n.3 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Comment, supra note 18, at 57. Asbestos
is known to have been used in lamp wicks as early as the fifth century B.C. Mehaffy,
supra note 18, at 342. By 1874, commercial production of asbestos insulation mate-
rial had begun. Borel, 493 F.2d at 1083 n.3. Production of asbestos cement com-
menced sometime between the latter half of the nineteenth century and 1903.
Mehaffy, supra note 18, at 342 (asbestos cement first produced in 1903). See also Borel,
493 F.2d at 1083 n.3 (asbestos cement introduced around 1870).
From 1877 to 1967, world asbestos production and use increased from 50 tons to
4 million tons per year. Comment, supra note 18, at 58. As of 1978, nearly 1 million
tons of asbestos were being consumed annually in the United States. Id By the end
of 1978, a total of almost 32 million tons of asbestos had been used in the United
States, most of it since 1940. Mehaffy, supra note 18, at 342.
25. See Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1045 n.22 (D.C. Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982); Vagley & Blanton, supra note 20, at 637. An
English study completed in the 1930's had documented a correlation between pulmo-
nary diseases and contact with asbestos. However, it was not until 1964 that such a
link was conclusively made. Vagley & Blanton, supra note 20, at 637 (citing Selikoff,
Asbestos Exposure and Neoplasia, 188 J. A.M.A. 22 (1964)). The following year, Dr.
Irving Selikoff and others published a report in the Annals of the New York Academy
of Science which identified a positive correlation between potential health hazards
and the exposure of insulation workers to asbestos. See Mehaffy, supra note 18, at 344
(citing Selikoff, Churg, & Hammond, The Occurrence of Asbestosis Among Insulation Work-
ers in the United States, ANN. N.Y. READ. ScI., 132, 139 (1965)). Consequently, one
commentator has suggested that 1965 was the milestone year in terms of when an
1982-831 1341
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causal link between latent disease and exposure to toxic substances, 26 cou-
pled with the expansion of the law of products liability,2 7 have led to a tre-
mendous growth in the number of lawsuits brought against manufacturers of
asbestos products.28 Tort actions have been brought by, or on behalf of, in-
asbestos manufacturer should have been put on notice of hazards involved in the use
of its products. Id
Recognition of a link between the diseases of lung cancer and mesothelioma and
exposure to asbestos occurred in the 1970's. Id One commentator, however, claims
that the link between asbestos and lung cancer was established as early as 1955.
Comment, supra note 18, at 60 (citing N.Y. ACAD. OF Sci., Cancer and the Worker, 36
(1977)).
26. Ingram, supra note 20, at 317. Asbestos-related diseases comprise one variety
of products liability actions which some commentators have termed "toxic torts." See
Podgers, Toxic Time Bombs, 67 A.B.A.J. 139 (Feb. 1981). Toxic torts involve the medi-
cal problems of persons exposed to chemical by-products of industrialized society. Id
Since medical science has only recently discovered a link between toxic substances
and disease, the search for answers to the growing number of problems arising out of
these suits is in its legal infancy. Id See Ingram, supra note 20, at 317. Generally,
toxic torts encompass latent diseases which appear several years after initial exposure
to the toxic substance. Podgers, supra, at 139. Latent disease cases differ from those
involving traditional torts because in the latter, a victim generally knows the identity
of the party that injured him and when the injury occurred. Id at 140.
27. One article suggests that the advent of strict liability and the abolition of
privity of contract between the supplier or manufacturer and the injured party has
increased the number of lawsuits brought against manufacturers, including those
who produce asbestos products. See Vagley & Blanton, supra note 20, at 640-42. Ad-
ditionally, the expansion of statute of limitations periods for cumulative trauma and
long latency diseases has arguably led to a geometrical progression in the number of
claims which may be brought against manufacturers of products years after initial
exposure. Id at 642. Commentators have suggested that the most important event
within recent expansion of products liability law has been the demise of the require-
ment that a plaintiff demonstrate the responsibility of a particular manufacturer or
producer for the product which caused his injury. Id Four policy theories have been
espoused by courts to lessen the burden of plaintiffs who are unable to determine
which one of several defendant-manufacturers produced the product that caused the
injury. See Ingram, supra note 20, at 328-33. These four theories-referred to as "al-
ternative liability," "concert of action," "enterprise liability" and "market share lia-
bility"-are particularly applicable to the asbestos context where an insulation
worker may be unable to identify which manufacturer's insulation fiber caused his
injury. See id
28. Ingram, supra note 20, at 317-18; Mehaffy, supra note 18, at 344-45. The
landmark case of Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. opened the floodgates for
asbestos litigation. See Mehaffy, supra note 18, at 345 (citing Borel v. Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974)).
See also Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1215
(6th Cir. 1980), modifwdon reh'g, 657 F.2d 814, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981). Borel
sustained a jury's finding that an unreasonable danger in the anticipated use of asbes-
tos products was foreseeable to the manufacturers of asbestos products, and, there-
fore, a duty to warn existed. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076
(5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). As a result of the finding that manu-
facturers had a duty to warn of the dangers of exposure to asbestos, Borel triggered an
avalanche of lawsuits against the entire asbestos manufacturing industry. See, e.g.,
Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1215 (6th
Cir. 1980),modifedon re'g, 657 F.2d 814, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981) (251 claims
as of May 4, 1978, but 1,370 claims by the summer of 1979). See also Keene Corp. v.
Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007
[Vol. 28: p. 13351342
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jured asbestos workers following manifestation of symptoms of asbestos-re-
lated disease or after their injuries have been medically diagnosed. 29 These
workers claim that the defendant manufacturer or producer failed to ade-
quately warn them of the danger of working in close proximity to asbestos
and, therefore, should be held liable under various tort theories.
30
Manufacturers have been largely unprepared for the deluge of tort
claims against them.3 1 Their consequent fear of exhausting their products
(1982) (6,000 lawsuits as of June, 1981); Eagle-Picher, 523 F. Supp. at 111 (5,500
claims as of early 1981). As of August 27, 1982, Johns-Manville alone was faced with
16,500 claims. Wall St. J., Aug. 27, 1982, at 1, col. 6. The Travelers Companies had
more than 20,000 claims against it by individuals claiming injury due to asbestos
exposure by August 1983. Knowlton, Asbestos Litigation: Which Way Out? 12 THE
BRIEF 5, 5 (August 1983).
29. Note, Duty to lndemni6 and to Defend-Each Insurer Which Provides Coverage Dur-
ing Workers' Exposure to Asbestos is Proportionately and Indvidually Liable to Defend and In-
demnif) its Insured, 26 VILL. L. REV. 1080, 1084 & nn.21-23 (1981). Since most
asbestos diseases are occupationally related, workers' compensation claims have also
increased. Mansfield, supra note 5, at 869. One commentator notes that while work-
ers' compensation may be available in most states as the exclusive remedy against an
employer for injury contracted in the workplace, there is wide "variation among
states both as to the amount of compensation available and the burden of proof
placed upon the worker before he can recover." Vagley & Blanton, supra note 20, at
649. The inconsistency in the state-by-state handling of the problem is exacerbated
by slow processing of claims due to overburdened state courts. Id at 648. As a
consequence, not only is the outcome of litigation uncertain, but the process is
lengthy and costly for the injured or dying worker. Id
Workers' compensation remedies do not bar injured workers-even those who
have been given awards under the workers' compensation laws-from instituting
third-party suits against producers and suppliers of the products to which these work-
ers have been exposed in the workplace. Id. at 650. For a discussion of the failure of
state workers' compensation laws to compensate adequately victims of asbestos-re-
lated disease, see Treiger, supra note 21, at 182-83. See also Fitzhugh, Disheartenitg
Prospects. The Stress of Occupational Disease Cases on the Longshoremens 'and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, 22 S. TEX. L.J. 471 (1982); Smith & Birck, Sailing the Unchartered Seas
of Asbestos Litigation under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, 22
WM & MARY L. REV. 177 (1980).
30. Mansfield, supra note 5, at 866. See Note, supra note 29, at 1084-85 & nn.24-
25. The plaintiffs in these asbestos cases, as in other products liability cases, usually
plead strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranty. Mansfield, supra note 5, at
866. For a discussion of alternative theories of liability which have led to an expan-
sion of manufacturers' liability for alleged asbestos-caused injuries, see Ingram, supra
note 20, at 328-33.
If the manufacturers are found liable in these underlying tort actions, the manu-
facturers look to their insurers for defense and indemnification based on the terms of
the manufacturers' insurance policies. See Note, The Calculus of Insurer Liability in As-
bestos-Related Disease Litigation." Manifestation + Injurious Exposure - Continuous Trigger,
23 B.C.L. REV. 1141, 1142 (1982).
31. Brief for Amicus Curiae, Commercial Union Insurance Cos. at 12, Eagle-
Picer, 682 F.2d at 12. Most asbestos manufacturers, whether or not they were aware
of their potential liability, failed to set aside financial reserves for such an eventuality.
Id Furthermore, many manufacturers did not insure themselves prior to 1955. Id
See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1981),cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982) (uninsured prior to 1961); Porter v. American Optical
Corp., 641 F.2d 1128, 1142 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v.
Porter, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981) (manufacturer uninsured prior to 1954); Insurance Co.
1982-831 1343
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liability insurance policy limits has been heightened by a disclaimer of liabil-
ity from the United States Government.3 2 Additionally, the interpretation
of the language contained in the agreements between manufacturers and
their insurers has remained unclear since no concensus could be reached as
to when "bodily injury" occurs in ailments characterized by long latency
periods.33 These factors have resulted in a proliferation of actions by asbes-
of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1215 (6th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981) (the court deemed Forty-Eight self-insured prior to
1955). Eagle-Picher, 523 F. Supp. at 110, 111 (Eagle-Picher was uninsured prior to
1968). Since most manufactuers continued to produce asbestos products until the
early 1970's, these manufacturers face enormous potential liability for asbestos-ori-
ented diseases. See, e.g., Eagle-Richer, 682 F.2d at 23; Keene, 667 F.2d at 1038;
ACandS, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 666 F.2d 819, 820 (3d Cir. 1981). This
potential liability is exacerbated by the fact that manufacturers have been, and prob-
ably will be, unable to obtain insurance coverage for these claims. See Vagley &
Blanton, supra note 20, at 656. See also Oshinsky, Insurance Coverage for Asbestos Tort
Liability Litigation, 5 J. PRODS. LIAB. 69, 73 (1982).
32. Comment, supra note 21, at 192-96. With the onslaught of tort litigation-
against them, asbestos manufacturers have begun to seek indemnity from third par-
ties including the United States Government. Id. Manufacturers of asbestos prod-
ucts argue that the government bears some legal, moral, and financial responsibility
for asbestos claims. See id. at 194-96. They point out that military specifications
mandated the use of asbestos in products manufactured for the government during
World War II. Id. at 194-95. Furthermore, they claim careless work practices in
naval shipyards during World War II contributed to the high incidence of asbestos-
related disease among persons in the shipbuilding industries. See id The govern-
ment, however, has steadfastly denied any liability for asbestos-related disease, hiring
a team of over 60 attorneys to defend asbestos claims filed against it. Id. At least one
court has agreed with the government's position. In 1979, the District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia dismissed all third-party claims by an asbestos manufac-
turer against the United States. Glover v. Johns-Manville Corp. v. United States,
525 F. Supp. 894 (E.D. Va. 1979), affd, 662 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding that
active negligence of asbestos manufacturers precluded indemnification from the fed-
eral government even though the government was also negligent in causing plaintiffs'
asbestos-related disease). But see Barlich v. Turner & Newell, Ltd., No. 78-1027 (E.D.
Pa. 1980) (denying motion to dismiss U.S. government as party defendant).
The role of the federal government in compensating victims of asbestos-related
disease has also been limited by federal legislation. The Federal Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act has exempted defense contractors from liability
for underlying asbestos claims. See Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1983).
Keene Corporation, a producer of asbestos, sought recovery from the federal
government through a different approach. Keene filed "omnibus" cases in which it
sought recovery from the government for all past and future monies paid to claim-
ants in underlying asbestos claims filed against it. Keene Corp. v. United States, 700
F.2d 836 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 195 (1983) (holding that notice filed by
plaintiff of a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1846(h), 2671-
2680 (1983), was insufficient, that there was no admiralty jurisdiction over the claims,
and therefore denying any relief).
33. Rosow & Liederman, An Overview to the Interpretative Problems of "Occurrence" in
Comprehensive General Liability Insurance, 16 Forum 1148, 1152 (Summer 1980); Note,
supra note 30, at 1142. See also Mansfield, supra note 5, at 874-75. The problems
encountered in determining when "bodily injury occurs" within the meaning of an
insurance agreement in the latent disease context is not peculiar to the asbestos prob-
lem. See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1983) (synthetic
1344 [Vol. 28: p. 1335
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tos manufacturers against their insurers seeking declaratory relief in the con-
text of coverage for asbestos-related injuries. 34 The focus of these disputes is
a short clause contained in virtually every insuring agreement which, in the-
ory, is used to define the "trigger" of an insurer's liability to its insured. 35
Under the standard CGL policy in force between an asbestos manufac-
turer and its insurer, the insurer agrees to indemnify its insured for all sums
which the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of
"bodily injury" caused by an "occurrence" during the policy period. 36 Be-
cause there may be a long latency period between the time when one inhales
an asbestos fiber and the subsequent time when an asbestos-caused disease
estrogen, dienestrol (DEN)); Michigan Chem. Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 530 F.
Supp. 147 (W.D. Mich. 1982) (insurance dispute over occurrence of disease caused by
the toxin polybrominated bipheny (PBB)); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. E.R.
Squibb & Sons, 95 Misc. 2d 222, 406 N.Y.S.2d 658 (1978) (insurance dispute over
occurrence of disease caused by diethylstilbestrol (DES)).
34. See Rosow & Liederman, supra note 33, at 1152. There are approximately
twenty pending declaratory judgment actions on this same issue. See, e.g., ACandS,
Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 666 F.2d 819 (3d Cir. 1981); Commercial Union
Ins. Co. v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 553 F. Supp. 425 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Commercial
Union Ins. Co. v. Sepco Corp., No. 81-769 (E.D. La.), cited in Brief for Amicus Cu-
riae, Commercial Union Ins. Cos. at A-2, Eagle-Richer, 682 F.2d at 12; Zurich Ins. Co.
v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., No. 78-8760 (Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook County), cited 1) Brief
for Amicus Curiae, Commercial Union Ins. Cos. at A-l, Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 12.
Besides these pending actions, three other courts have already resolved disputes
over insurance coverage between asbestos producers and their insurers. See Keene
Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 1007 (1982); Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations,
Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980), modifiedon reh'g, 657 F.2d 814, cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1109 (1981).
In each of these controversies over insurance coverage, the asbestos manufac-
turer has been forced to defend in the actions brought by plaintiffs with asbestos-
related disease. In addition, the manufacturer has had to pay costs and face liabili-
ties that would otherwise be assumed by its insurer. ACandS, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty
and Sur. Co., 666 F.2d 819, 821 (3d Cir. 1981).
35. See Rosow & Liederman, supra note 33, at 1152. See also Mansfield, supra
note 5, at 875.
One significance of this standard policy language is that it sets forth the trigger
of coverage. Oshinsky, supra note 31, at 81. The trigger is the event which requires
an insurance policy to provide coverage for a claim. Id Furthermore, this standard
language also determines the scope of an insurer's obligations once a policy is trig-
gered. Id "The trigger of coverage is injury during the policy period. Once its pol-
icy is triggered, an insurance company is required to pay all sums which the
policyholder is legally obligated to pay in the underlying tort case." Id.
36. See Mansfield, supra note 5, at 875. Insurance policies usually contain stan-
dard language drafted by the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters and the
Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau. Ingram, supra note 20, at 339. This standardiza-
tion of policy language is said to allow the prospective insured to compare coverage
of potential insurers, enabling both parties to know the exact scope of coverage. Id
at 339-40 (citing Elliot, The New Comprehensive General Liability Policy, in LIABILITY
INSURANCE DISPUTES 12-3, 12-5 (S. Schreiber ed. 1968)). Prior to 1966, the standard
policy form provided for indemnity for damages because of bodily injugy caused by an
accident. Rosow & Liederman, supra note 33, at 1148-49 (citing 1 LONG, LAW Or
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first manifests itself,3 7 insurance carriers that have insured a manufacturer of
asbestos at various times have taken conflicting positions as to whether bod-
ily injury occurs at the time an individual is exposed to asbestos or at the
time an asbestos-related disease manifests itself.
38
Inconsistent theories of policy interpretation referred to as "the manifes-
tation theory"3 9 and "the exposure theory" 40 have been used to justify when
LIABILITY INSURANCE § 11.01, at 11-4). In 1966, the standard policy was revised so
that "occurrence" was substituted for "accident." Id.
Although some policy language differs from the current standard form, the in-
surer essentially agrees to
• . . pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become
legally obligated to pay as damages because of. . . bodily 'njuy . . . caused
by an occurrence . . . . bodily injuiy is defined as "bodily injury, sickness or
disease sustained by any person which occurs during the pohcy period, including
death at any time resulting therefrom."
Occurrence is defined as "an accident, including continuous or repeated
exposure to conditions, which results in bodily inj'uy .... "
Mansfield, supra note 5, at 875. For an excellent discussion of the development and
content of the standard CGL policy, see Note, supra note 30, at 1147-48. For a discus-
sion of the variant policy language used in the American Motorists policies, see note 6
supra.
37. See Vagley & Blanton, supra note 20, at 639. See also Mansfield, supra note 5,
at 862. It is not uncommon for an asbestos-related disease to manifest itself twenty to
thirty years after the initial exposure to asbestos. Comment, supra note 18, at 77.
38. See Rosow & Liederman, supra note 33, at 1154; Note, supra note 29, at 1085-
86. The plaintiffs in the underlying tort actions were typically exposed to asbestos
products supplied by different manufacturers, each of whom periodically switched
insurance companies during the years in which the workers were exposed. Note, As-
bestos Litigation: The Insurance Coverage Question, 15 IND. L. REV. 831, 834 (1982). In
the case of asbestos-related disease, the inhalation of asbestos fibers may begin during
one policy period, the insidious disease may develop during subsequent policy peri-
ods, and manifestation may occur in still another policy period. Note, supra note 30,
at 1142. Different products liability insurers are likely to provide coverage at differ-
ent points in the development of the plaintiff's disease. Id at 1143. Furthermore,
since the manufacturer may be uninsured during all or some of this period, identify-
ing the party liable for indemnification is not only difficult, it is also crucial. See id.
Because the express language of the CGL policy may be susceptible to varying plausi-
ble interpretations, and there is no concensus among the parties as to when the asbes-
tos-related disease "occurs" under the policy, the parties have attempted to give the
policies' terms their own interpretation as to both what is the required accident or
occurrence and when it occurs. See Vagley & Blanton, supra note 20, at 652. See also
Rosow & Liederman, supra, at 1149.
39. See Mansfield, supra note 5, at 876; Vagley & Blanton, supra note 20, at 652.
Under the manifestation theory, the time at which the asbestos-related disease be-
came known or should have been known to the plaintiff, or the date on which the
plaintiff is diagnosed as having such a disease-whichever occurs first-is the control-
ling date for the trigger of coverage. Mansfield, supra note 5, at 876. In applying this
theory, a court construes the standard CGL policy language "bodily injury" to in-
clude only injury which manifests itself during the policy period. Note, supra note 30,
at 1155. Thus, this theory would allow an insurer to disclaim any duty to defend or
indemnify if its policy had been in force when the injurious act occurred, but had
expired by the time the injury became evident. See Note, Products Liabilzy Insurance-
Time of Exposure Triggers Coverage for Asbestos-Related Diseases, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 1127,
1128 n.7.
By denying that bodily injury occurs prior to the manifestation of symptoms, the
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 6 [1983], Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol28/iss6/10
RECENT DEVELOPMENT
an insurer should become liable. Under the manifestation theory, bodily
injury occurs when the injury manifests itself.4 ' Consequently, those insurers
providing coverage at the time of manifestation of the asbestos-related dis-
ease must defend and indemnify the insured in any lawsuit alleging an asbes-
tos-related injury or death. 42 Exposure theorists postulate instead that
manifestation theory is contrary to the medical evidence establishing that asbestos-
related diseases reach an advanced stage of development prior to the appearance of
any initial symptom. Comment, Liabdithy Insurance for Insidious Disease: Who Picks Up
the Tab?, 48 FORDHAM L. REv. 657, 668-69 (1980).
The manifestation theory has, at one time or another been advocated by Eagle-
Picher, Liberty Mutual, Aetna Insurance Co., Insurance Co. of N. Am., the majority
of the London Market known as the "Bird" defendants, and others. Mansfield, supra
note 5, at 876.
40. The exposure theory assumes that injury is simultaneous with the first in-
halation of an asbestos fiber, even though medical support for this proposition is
inconclusive. Comment, supra note 39, at 668-69. But cf Vagley & Blanton, supra
note 20, at 652 (medical evidence indicates that exposure to asbestos results in tissue
injury upon first inhalation of the asbestos fiber). The medical evidence upon which
this theory is based demonstrates that when an inhaled asbestos fiber reaches an alve-
olus in the lung, minute cellular or histological changes occur; therefore, within the
meaning of the policy, these histological changes or "insults" to the lung are equated
with bodily injury. Mansfield, supra note 5, at 876. Since these histological changes
to the lung are equated with bodly injuiy; an "occurrence" of bodily nj'uly within the
meaning of the policy would have taken place. See id
Major advocates of the exposure theory include Traveler's Ins. Co., Hartford
Accident and Indemnity Co., a minority of the London Market referred to as the
"Froude" defendants and all asbestos manufacturers except Eagle-Picher. Mansfield,
supra note 5, at 876. However, both insureds and insurers have vacillated between
exposure and manifestation positions in instances where 1) the insured's coverage
would be increased by virtue of application of another theory and 2) where the in-
surer's liability would be decreased through the application of another theory. Note,
supra note 39, at 1128 n.7; Note, supra note 38, at 845.
41. Vagley & Blanton, supra note 20, at 652. For a more detailed description of
the manifestation theory, see note 36 supra. It has been suggested that the manifesta-
tion approach results in placing losses in more recent policy years because it is in
those years that the preponderance of the asbestos-related diseases, currently being
litigated, manifested themselves. Note, supra note 38, at 844. The net effect is a
dramatic increase in premiums for current general liability insurance. Mansfield,
supra note 5, at 876. Some commentators have also noted that the manifestation
theory has the "apparent advantage of expeditious, although perhaps more arbitrary
resolution of the question when insurance liability accrues." Vagley & Blanton, supra
note 20, at 652 (citing Comment, supra note 39, at 668).
42. For a discussion of the impact of the manifestation theory upon an insurer's
duty to defend and indemnify, see note 39 supra. The standard CGL insurance policy
contains a duty to defend clause. Note, supra note 38, at 843. An insurer's duty to
defend an insured is not only distinguishable from, but is in some ways broader than,
its duty to indemnify. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc.,
451 F. Supp. 1230, 1244 (E.D. Mich. 1978), 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980), modifed on
reh'g, 657 F.2d 814, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981). The provision means that, as
part of the consideration for the premium, the insurer is obligated to pay the ex-
penses incurred in the defense of any action alleging liability which is covered by the
policy to indemnify. Comment, supra, at 843. The duty to defend extends to actions
which may be groundless or even fraudulent. Id Further, the costs of legal defense
are in addition to the limit of the insurer's liability stated in the policy. Id. The duty
to indemnify arises under the policies only when damages are determined. Vagley &
1982-831 1347
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bodily injury occurs upon initial exposure to the asbestos fiber.43 Conse-
quently, under the exposure theory, those who insured the asbestos manufac-
turer from the time of the first exposure until the exposure ceased must share
any liability proportionately.
44
The inability of insureds and insurers to reach a concensus as to the
appropriate theory of coverage has forced them to look to the courts to deter-
mine their rights, liabilities, and obligations under their insurance con-
tracts. 45 In Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc. ,46 the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that each insurer providing cov-
erage during an injured party's exposure to asbestos is both proportionately
Blanton, supra note 20, at 651-52. For a discussion of the relevant language in CGL
policies, see note 36 and accompanying text, supra.
The exposure theory tends to cloud the issue of the duty to defend. Some expo-
sure theorists argue that manufacturers must pay defense costs on a pro rata basis.
Others, particularly manufacturers, argue that joint and several obligations on insur-
ers preclude any requirement that they contribute a portion of these costs.
Mansfield, supra note 5, at 877. Confronted with this issue, the district court in
Forty-Eight held that the duty to defend in the asbestos setting should be co-extensive
with the duty to indemnify. Forty-Eight, 451 F. Supp. at 1244. Therefore, the court
declared that defense costs be apportioned in identical fashion to the underlying
damage claims. Id.
43. Vagley & Blanton, supra note 20, at 652. For a more detailed description of
the exposure theory, see notes 40 & 44 and accompanying text supra. The exposure or
"pro rata theory" also embodies a second major subdivision. Mansfield, supra note 5,
at 876. The second major branch of exposure theorists contend "that each carrier on
the risk from the onset of exposure until diagnosis or the filing of the underlying
lawsuit" is jointly and severally liable to the manufacturer for defense and indemnifi-
cation. Id This hybrid theory is based on the belief that once asbestos fibers become
embedded in the lung, they remain resident there causing not only initial, but also,
progressive injury to the lungs. Id at 876-77.
This subsequent development of disease after initial inhalation of the asbestos
fiber is known as "exposure-in-residence." Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am.,
667 F.2d 1034, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
44. Vagley & Blanton, supra note 20, at 652. Since coverage will be triggered by
each injured plaintiff's exposure to the insured's asbestos products, the general eco-
nomic effect of the exposure theory is to spread losses back over numerous years of
primary insurance coverage. Mansfield, supra note 5, at 877. The net result is that
manufacturers, particularly those which are no longer in the asbestos business, will
not be faced with increased liability insurance costs. Id. Whereas losses under an
exposure theory are spread back over numerous years of primary coverage, under a
manifestation theory losses are pushed forward in time through increased premium
costs. See id at 876-77. Consequently, an exposure theory benefits more recent excess
insurers who will not have to indemnify since applicable current primary policy lim-
its will not be readily exhausted. Id at 877. The exposure theory, however, presents
drawbacks for manufacturers such as Eagle-Picher who were not covered during the
greatest period of exposure to its products. Eagle-Picher, 523 F. Supp. at 118.
45. Rosow & Liederman, supra note 33, at 1148-49. These declaratory judgment
actions focus on the interpretation of the language used in the standard CGL insur-
ance policies. See Mansfield, supra note 5, at 874-79.
Insurance policies generally are interpreted in the same way as other contracts.
I G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 15:1 (2d ed. 1959). In construing
the terms of insurance policies, the policy language should be given its clear, literal,
and unambiguous meaning. 13 J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND
PRACTICE § 7384 at 67-70 (1976). The plain meaning of the policy terms is to be
1348
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and individually liable to defend and indemnify its insured. 47 The court
interpreted according to their common dictionary definition. See, e.g. Fuerstenberg v.
Mowell, 63 Ohio App. 2d 120, 409 N.E.2d 1035, 1036-37 (1978).
Where a policy is ambiguous, the Court will attempt to ascertain the intention
of the parties and effectuate it. 13 J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN § 7385, at 112
(1976). The meaning which parties attach to the terms of the contract may also be
inferred from their conduct. Id at 134.
If the meaning of the terms remains unclear, the court will construe the policy in
favor of the insured in order to effectuate insurance's purpose of indemnifying loss.
See Note, supra note 38, at 835. In construing terms in favor of the insured, the court
will use the insured's reasonable expectation as a guide. Keene Corp. v. Insurance
Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
The First Circuit has, however, noted that a presumption in favor of the insured
might be weakened where the insured was a businessman with equal bargaining
power. See Commercial Ins. Co. of Newark, NJ. v. Gonzalez, 512 F.2d 1307, 1313
(1st Cir. 1975).
For a critical analysis of the doctrine of reasonable expectations, see generally
Squires, A Skeptical Look at the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectation, 6 FORUM 252 (Oct.
1970). For a critical analysis of the doctrine of reasonable expectations as applied to
the asbestos context, see Comment, Insurer Liability in the Asbestos Disease Context-Ap-
plication of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 27 S.D.L. REv. 239 (1982).
46. 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980), modifiedon reh'g, 657 F.2d 814, cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1109 (1981). Forty-Eight manufactured asbestos-containing products from 1923
to 1970. Id. at 1214. Since Forty-Eight could not produce insurance policies for the
period prior to 1955, the court deemed Forty-Eight to be self-insured during that
time period. Id at 1215. From 1955 to 1981, Forty-Eight was consecutively insured
against products liability judgments through policies with varying coverage amounts,
but which nonetheless contained uniform liability language. Id. at 1215-16. A dis-
pute as to liability among Forty-Eight's various insurance carriers resulted in the
Insurance Company of North America (INA) initiating a declaratory judgment ac-
tion. Id at 1216.
On appeal, INA, Affiliated FM, Illinois National, Liberty Mutual, and various
amici curiae, including Eagle-Picher, advocated a manifestation approach. Id
Forty-Eight, Travelers and other amici curiae advocated the exposure theory. Id at
1217.
The district court in Forty-Eight concluded that since a deposit of asbestos fibers
causes medical injury to the lung, each such injury constitutes an "occurrence"
within the policy language therein triggering the insurer's liability. Forty-Eight, 451
F. Supp. at 1239. Finding that asbestos injuries are both .progressive and incapable of
apportionment by time, the district court held that each insurer on the risk when a
diseased plaintiff was allegedly exposed is obligated to provide a defense and, in
many instances, indemnification. Id. at 1239-40. District Judge Feikens reasoned
that since a manufacturer can be held jointly and severally liable for the injuries, the
insurer on the risk during the same indivisible injurious process should also be held
jointly and severally liable. Id (citing Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493
F.2d 1076, 1094 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974)).
In adopting the exposure theory, the district court rejected Forty-Eight and
Travelers' Insurance Company's theory that asbestos-related disease should be con-
sidered a "continuing tort," requiring all insurers on risk from the time of the alleged
initial exposure through manifestation to be jointly and severally liable. Id. at 1238.
Under the district court's decision, Forty-Eight must bear the judgment and defense
costs for injuries apportioned to the period when it had no coverage. Id at 1243-45.
47. Id at 1239. The court prefaced its analysis by stating that it was desirable
to arrive at an administratively manageable interpretation of the policies which
would reduce litigation. Id at 1218. However, the court dismissed the possibility of
holding hearings to determine the point at which the disease occurs in a given case
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based its adoption of the "pro rata exposure theory"'48 on three grounds: the
expectation of the contracting parties that coverage would parallel the un-
derlying theory of tort liability which injured plaintiffs had asserted against
the manufacturer; 49 the agreement of the medical community that the time
asbestosis first manifests itself is not the time when bodily injury occurs; 50
and the judicial policy of construing ambiguous policy language in such a
fashion as to promote coverage. 5'
because 1) the cost would be prohibitive and 2) there was no medical certainty as to
the point at which asbestosis occurs. Id
In his dissenting opinion in Forty-Eight, Judge Merritt argued for adoption of a
discoverability rule under which a carrier's liability would attach when "identifiable
harm" occurs. Id. at 123-32 (Merritt, J., dissenting). Judge Merritt believed that
such a rule was made in accord with the medical evidence. Id at 1230 (Merritt, J.,
dissenting). Under this rule, "identifiable harm" would occur when the disease is
detectable by x-ray. Id However, since most victims will not bring suit until actual
manifestation of the disease, Judge Merritt also argued for a limitation period for
bringing these claims. Id at 1230-31 (Merrit, J., dissenting). Under this arbitrary
limitation period, the disease of asbestosis is deemed discoverable ten years from the
date of exposure, with each further exposure considered to be an additional compen-
sable injury. Id at 1231 (Merrit, J., dissenting). If there is no manifestation of asbes-
tosis within ten years after exposure, those insurers on the risk at the time the disease
becomes manifest are liable. Id
48. Under the "pro rata" theory of liability, the extent of an insurer's liability
would be determined by the duration of the claimant's exposure to the manufac-
turer's products during that insurer's policy period in relation to the total duration of
the claimant's exposure to the manufacturer's products. Comment, supra note 38, at
842. The "pro rata share" theory may be illustrated as follows: If a plaintiff is ex-
posed to asbestos products from 1942-1946, his asbestosis is diagnosed in 1975, and he
filed a lawsuit in 1976, all insurers who issued policies from 1942-1946 would be
obligated to defend and indemnify the insured. See Mansfield, supra note 5, at 877.
Accordingly, if "insurer A provided 3 years of coverage, insurer B an additional 3
years, and the manufacturer was uninsured for the remaining 3 years, liability would
be allocated at 1/3 for each of the concerns." Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight
Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1244 (6th Cir. 1980), mod idon reh'g, 657 F.2d 814,
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981). This pro rata method of apportionment is based
upon joint and several liability. Mansfield, supra note 5, at 876.
49. 633 F.2d at 1219. The Forty-Eight court argued that because of the manu-
facturer's failure to warn of the hazards of asbestos, workers contracted disease or
injury from continuous exposure to the mineral. Id Since the insurance policies in
Forty-Eight were designed to protect against suits based on a failure to warn theory,
the insured could reasonably expect its coverage to parallel the exposure theory of
liability. Id Further, Judge Keith noted that the policies in question contemplated
coverage for cumulative trauma cases against the insured because the insurers had
inserted a provision referring to "continuous or repeated exposure to conditions which result
in injury." Id at 1223 (emphasis added).
50. Id at 1219. The court's determination that asbestos-related disease does not
occur when it first manifests itself was based on the testimony of Dr. Wright, an
histologist, or expert in the study of human tissue. See id. Wright had distinguished
the tissue injury which marks the origins of the disease from the actual diagnosis of
the disease. Id Consequently, by adopting the exposure theory, the Forty-Eight court
implicitly decided that injury occurs upon first inhalation of the asbestos fiber. Id at
1218.
51. Id at 1219. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that, as applied to the progressive
disease context, the terms of the policies were "inherently ambiguous". Id at 1222.
1350
16
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 6 [1983], Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol28/iss6/10
RECENT DEVELOPMENT
In 1981, in Porter o. American Optical Corp. ,52 the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals rejected the lower court's application of the manifestation theory as
the trigger of the insurer's liability.53 Without independent analysis, the
Porter court followed the decision reached in Forty-Eight and applied the ex-
posure theory to the facts of the case before it.
54
Under the applicable state law, when there are ambiguities in the policy, the policy is
to be construed to promote coverage. Id. at 1219 (citations omitted).
The Forty-Eight court, in adopting the exposure theory, rejected the manifesta-
tion theory proponents' argument that various health insurance, workmen's compen-
sation, and statute of limitations cases sustaining the manifestation approach should
be controlling. Id at 1220-23. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that statute of limitations
cases decided in favor of a manifestation rule are grounded in policy considerations
inapposite to those present in insurance cases. Id at 1220. The court opined that
while a manifestation rule in a statute of limitations setting would promote fairness to
injured plaintiffs acting in good faith, such a rule in the insurance context would not
effect the purpose of insurance contracts, namely, to cover the insured. Id.
The court also rejected an analogy to workmen's compensation cases because in
that context adoption of a "last employer pays" rule is grounded in efficient adminis-
tration. Id at 1221. It stated that administrative convenience does not override rules
of contract interpretation. Id The Forty-Eight court reasoned that the health insur-
ance cases, although ruling that the date of diagnosis triggers coverage, rely on the
same rules of policy construction applicable to Forty-Eight. Id Consequently, the
Sixth Circuit construed Forty-Eight's insurance policies to honor the legitimate ex-
pectation of the parties and to promote coverage. Applying this rule of policy con-
struction to the facts of the case before it, the court ruled that the exposure theory
should be embraced. Id. at 1221-22.
52. 641 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1982). The plain-
tiff brought suit against American Optical alleging injury from a defect in a respira-
tor and filter apparatus supplied by this manufacturer. Id. at 1131. The primary
defendant, American Optical, joined as third-party defendants its various insurance
companies on the risk during the plaintiff's employment and illness. A jury found
that the defective respirator had caused the plaintiff, an asbestos worker, to incur
asbestosis. Id. The district court was faced with the remaining third-party claims
against the defendant's various insurers. Id. However, since the claim involved a
respirator, it was argued that the only years of coverage in dispute were the years in
which the device was used. Id
53. 641 F.2d at 1145. The district court had concluded that the insurer on the
risk at the time of the manifestation of the claimant's illness was liable for defense
and indemnification of the insured. Porter v. American Optical Corp., No. 75-2202,
slip op. at 5 (E.D. La. Nov. 23, 1977). The district court had equated the policy term
"bodily injury" with the terms "sickness or disease". Porter, 641 F.2d at 1145. Conse-
quently, the district court reasoned that while the worker was exposed to the injuri-
ous material during Aetna Casualty & Surety Company's period of coverage, the
continued exposure did not result in any injury within the meaning of that insurer's
policy. Porter, No. 75-2202, slip op. at 5. The result of the district court's findings was
that Aetna, which was the carrier on risk during the longest period of plaintiff expo-
sure, as well as the carrier on the risk when the actual diagnosis was made, was ex-
empted from liability. Note, supra note 29, at 1080, 1088 nn.44-45.
54. 641 F.2d at 1145. The Porter court then remanded the case for a determina-
tion of apportionment of liability among the casualty insurers consistent with the pro
rata theory adopted in Forty-Ei ht. Id
The exposure theory of Forty-Eight was also adopted without extensive analysis
by Judge Giles of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., No. 81-2129, slip
op. at 22-25 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 4, 1981). See also Sandoz, Inc. v. Employer's Liability
1982-83] 1351
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Subsequently, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit, in Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 55 was confronted with
three different theories of policy construction. Each theory had been postu-
lated to determine the extent to which various insurance policies covered a
manufacturer's liability for damages resulting from asbestos-related diseases
caused by its products. 56 Reversing the decision of the lower court which
had adopted the exposure theory,5 7 the District of Columbia Circuit held
that inhalation exposure, exposure-in-residence, and the manifestation of the
asbestos-related disease all triggered coverage under Keene's policies. 58 The
Assurance Corp., 554 F. Supp. 257 (1983) (accepting exposure theory in context of
latent disease caused by drug Mellaril).
55. 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982). Between
1948 and 1972, Keene manufactured thermal insulation products that contained as-
bestos. Id at 1038. Keene was, at the time of suit, named as a co-defendant in over
6,000 lawsuits alleging injury caused by exposure to Keene's asbestos products. Id
The underlying cases typically involved insulation workers or their survivors alleging
personal injury or death resulting from prolonged inhalation of asbestos fibers. Id
For a discussion of the underlying claims in insurance-related declaratory judgment
actions, see notes 2 & 28-30 and accompanying text supra.
From 1961 to 1981, various insurance companies had issued CGL policies to
Keene for protection against products liability suits and judgments. 667 F.2d at
1038-39. When Keene tendered its asbestos-related damage suits to its insurance
companies for defense and indemnification, each company denied responsibility
either in whole or in part. Id at 1039. Keene subsequently filed suit for declaratory
judgment and damages. Id
56. 667 F.2d at 1042-43. INA, Liberty Mutual, and Aetna argued in Keene that
coverage is triggered only by the manifestation of asbestosis, mesothelioma or lung
cancer during a policy period. Id Keene and Hartford Accident and Indemnity
Company advanced different versions of the exposure theory. Id at 1042. Based on
the medical evidence of asbestosis as a continuous process, Keene argued that succes-
sive coverage is triggered by both exposure to asbestos dust, or "inhalation exposure,"
and the subsequent development of the disease, or "exposure-in-residence." Id For a
discussion of these two major branches of the exposure theory, see notes 40 & 43supra.
Hartford advanced a variant of the exposure theory: that successive coverage
was triggered by continued exposure, but exposure-in-residence did not trigger fur-
ther coverage. Keene, 667 F.2d at 1242, 1244 n.18. Under Hartford's proposed the-
ory, each company's coverage would be determined by the ratio of exposure years
during its policy period to the entire period of inhalation. Id at 1039.
57. 667 F.2d at 1039. The district court had held that defense and indemnifica-
tion costs should be prorated among the insurance carriers relative to the extent of
exposure during their respective policy periods. Id. Keene was deemed liable for a
pro rata share of the costs of defense and indemnification for the period of exposure
to its products while it was uninsured. Id
58. Id. at 1047. Judge Bazelon, writing for the majority in Keene, reasoned that
the allocation of rights and obligations established by the policies would be under-
mined if either exposure or manifestation were to represent the sole trigger of cover-
age. Id The court concluded that inhalation exposure, which is the initial exposure
to the asbestos fiber, was part of an injurious process which was sufficient to consti-
tute injury under the policies. Id. at 1046. The court noted that the initial exposure
was sufficient to trigger the insurer's liability, regardless of whether that particular
exposure caused a discrete and immediate injury. Id
Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit concluded that exposure-in-residence, or the time
between the inhalation of the asbestos fiber and the manifestation of the disease, was
a second trigger of insurer liability. See id at 1044. In so concluding, Judge Bazelon
1352 [Vol. 28: p. 1335
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Keene court reasoned that liability must parallel the injurious process of as-
bestosis in order to protect the manufacturer's rights under the insurance
policies. 59 Accordingly, the court found that insurers providing coverage
from the time of plaintiffs initial exposure to asbestos to the manifestation of
a related disease were fully liable once coverage was triggered.
60
It was against this background that the First Circuit, in Eagle-Picher,
began its analysis of whether the lower court's application of the manifesta-
tion theory of liability 61 to the respective CGL policies gave effect to the
intentions of the parties.
62
rejected the defendant-insurers' argument that each exposure to asbestos should be
characterized as a new and discrete injury. Id at 1044 n. 19. The court reasoned that
if defendants' argument were accepted, an insurer could argue that it is responsible
only for the discrete injuries which occurred during its policy periods. Id For a
discussion of the exposure-in-residence theory, see note 43 supra.
The court also decided that the manifestation of the asbestos-related disease was
a third trigger of an insurer's liability for the underlying personal injury suits brought
against the insured. 667 F.2d at 1044. The D.C. Circuit concluded that the reason-
able expectations of Keene in entering into the policies were, at the very least, assur-
ances that they would be covered for future manifestations of asbestos-related disease.
Id For a discussion of the manifestation theory, see notes 39 & 41-42 and accompa-
nying text supra.
59. 667 F.2d at 1046. The D.C. Circuit reasoned that during the time period
between plaintiff's initial exposure to asbestos and the time of manifestation of dis-
ease, the existence of latent injury and potential liability became known to the par-
ties. Id Hence, insurers and insureds knew that past occurrences were likely to have
set in motion injurious processes for which Keene might ultimately be liable. Id.
Thus, allowing insurers to terminate coverage prior to the manifestation of many
cases of disease would deprive Keene of its purchased protection. Id For a discussion
of the Forty-Eight court's contrary conclusion despite its similar attempt to construe
the insurance policies before it to meet the expectations of the parties, see note 49
supra.
60. 667 F.2d at 1048. The circuit court stated that once triggered, each policy
covered Keene's entire liability until its coverage limits were exhausted. Id To avoid
"stacking" or layering of applicable policy's limit of liability, the court held that
Keene could select the policy under which it wished to be fully indemnified with the
proviso that only one policy's limits could apply to each injury. Id at 1049-50. How-
ever, a selected policy might contain so-called contribution provisions governing the
allocation of liability when more than one policy covers a given injury. In such in-
stances, if more than one policy is applied to a given loss, the contribution provision
contained in the policy that Keene has selected to indemnify its losses would govern
the apportionment of the insurer's liability. Id at 1050.
61. For a discussion of the manifestation theory, see notes 39 & 41-42 and ac-
companying text supra.
The exposure theorists in Eagle-Picher had sought a pre-trial ruling in the district
court to determine whether the interpretation of the policies should be controlled by
the law of Ohio, Illinois, or England. The district court found no conflict among the
potentially applicable laws and thus did not decide which law should apply. For the
appeal, the First Circuit sought to be consistent with Illinois and Ohio law since the
parties had failed to show how the law of England might differ. 682 F.2d at 17 n.2.
62. 682 F.2d at 16-19. The First Circuit examined the language of the insurance
contracts at issue. The American Motorists policy in Eagle-Richer provided indemnifi-
cation for liability due to "personal injury caused by . . .an occurrence which takes
place during the policy period." Id. at 17. In contrast, the other insurance policies at
issue stated that the insurer agreed to "pay on behalf of the insured all sums which
1982-831 1353
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In its review of the lower court's decision, the First Circuit evaluated the
exposure theorists' contention that the district court had erred when it ex-
cluded extrinsic evidence of Eagle-Picher's intent in obtaining the policies.6 3
The exclusion of such evidence, the First Circuit concluded, was harmless
error.
64
According to the First Circuit, the principal issue on appeal was
whether the asbestos-related disease "results" soon after exposure, or whether
the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury
...caused by an occurrence." Id For a more detailed discussion of the language of
the policies at issue in Eagle-Picher, see notes 3-8 supra.
In examining these contracts, the court stated that its dominant purpose in con-
struing these policies was "to give effect to the intentions of the parties." 682 F.2d at
18, 23. The court noted that the American Motorists policy contained a definition of
"occurrence" identical to that contained in other companies' policies. This definition
required the resulting injury, not the exposure, to take place during the policy period.
Id at 24. Given the identical definition of "occurrence" in all the policies, the court
decided that Eagle-Picher could reasonably expect coverage from American Motor-
ists similar to that provided by its other insurers. Id. For a discussion of the princi-
ples of contract law which the courts use when construing insurance agreements, see
note 45 supra.
63. 682 F.2d at 16. Because the parties had agreed that the policy language was
unambiguous, the district court had refused to consider the exposure theorists' extrin-
sic evidence of the intentions of the parties. Id. at 18. The extrinsic evidence rejected
by the district court consisted primarily of an exchange of correspondence between
Eagle-Picher's corporate insurance manager and Liberty Mutual's claims-supervising
personnel regarding three asbestos-related claims between 1969 and 1971. Id at 21-
22 & n.7. The district court found the excluded letters to reflect tentative positions
and compromise rather than establishing the exposure theory as the proper interpre-
tation of the policies. Id at 222.
The First Circuit concluded that this evidence did not constitute a "course of
dealing" between Eagle-Picher and its insurers which established that coverage
would be based on the exposure theory. Id (citing Chase Manhattan Bank v. First
Marion Bank, 437 F.2d 1040, 1045-46 (5th Cir. 1971)). See U.C.C. § 1-205(1) (course
of dealing defined as a sequence of previous conduct between parties to particular
transaction which is fairly regarded as establishing common basis of understanding
for interpreting their expressions and other conduct). In addition, the court stated
that no evidence of "usage of trade" in the insurance industry as a whole was proffer-
red by the parties. 682 F.2d at 22. See U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (defining usage of the trade
as any practice or method of dealing having regularity of observance in a place,
vocation or trade as to justify expectation that it will be observed with respect to the
transaction in question and whose existence is to be proved as fact).
64. 682 F.2d at 22. The court noted that it is harmless error to refuse to admit
extrinsic evidence to support the findings of the trial judge. Id at 18, 22. Since there
was ample evidence in Eagle-Picher to support the district court's findings, any error
in excluding such evidence was harmless. Id The First Circuit added the caveat that
had it been argued below that the policy language was ambiguous, and therefore
that parol evidence should have been admitted to shed light on the meaning of the
terms, a more compelling case for reversible error would have existed. Id. at 21.
The exposure theorists also argued on appeal that the district court had erred by
refusing to admit evidence of Eagle-Picher's insurance sophistication and bargaining
power. Id at n.6. The circuit court in Eagle-Picher reasoned that any error in exclud-
ing such evidence was also harmless, concluding that the offer of proof did not show
that Eagle-Picher participated in the drafting of the agreement to such an extent so
as to deny it the benefit of favorable policy construction. Id (citations omitted).
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the disease "results" when it becomes clinically evident or manifest.6 5 In
determining when the asbestos-related disease "results," the court found that
sub-clinical, or undiscoverable, injury to the lung does not occur simultane-
ously with the first inhalation of an asbestos fiber. 66 It also noted that injury
is not an inevitable by-product of exposure to asbestos.67 Apart from the
medical evidence, the Eagle-Picher court found that a plain reading of the
policy language revealed that it is a discoverable injury which must take
place, or manifest itself, during the policy period in order to trigger
coverage.
6 8
65. Id at 17. The court framed the issue to be resolved with specific reference
only to the disease of asbestosis. Id Since the parties did not argue that the various
asbestos-related diseases should be treated differently under the policies, the First
Circuit did not differ with the lower court's decision not to consider mesothelioma
and lung cancer separately from asbestos. Id at 19 n.3.
66. Id at 18. The district court had received expert medical testimony from Dr.
Bernard Gee, a research scientist and clinician with vast experience in the area of
asbestos-related disease, and from Dr. Edward Burger, a researcher and administra-
tor. Eagle-Picher, 523 F. Supp. at 115. The testimony of these medical experts
showed that sub-clinical injuries-which are injuries that are undiscoverable-do
not occur with initial exposure to asbestos fibers. Id. This testimony thus contra-
dicted the central contention of the exposure theory proponents that exposure and
injury are simultaneous. The testimony of the experts revealed that the destructive
process begins only after those fibers which reach the tissues of the lung become de-
posited there. Id It is at this point that the human body's production of enzymes, in
an attempt to destroy the non-biodegradeable fiber, actually begins to scar the tissue
surrounding the fiber. Id See note 18 supra.
The First Circuit further observed that contemporaneous bodily injury and ex-
posure to asbestos appears to be even more remote with respect to mesothelioma and
lung cancer whose development, although dose-related, is not cumulative in nature
like asbestosis. Id at 19 n.3 (citing Vagley & Blanton, supra note 20). See note 21
supra.
67. 682 F.2d at 18. The expert testimony which had been presented to the dis-
trict court had concluded that along its route to the lungs, an asbestos fiber is likely to
be removed from the body either physiologically or biologically. Eagle-Picher, 523 F.
Supp. at 115. Natural filters of the nose, throat, or lining of the pulmonary system
and cells in the lymphatic system all serve as defenses which an asbestos fiber must
overcome on its way to becoming embedded in the lung. See id Cf Foroy-Eight 451 F.
Supp., 1230, 1236 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (asbestos fibers of a certain length cannot be
removed and become embedded in the lung tissue). However, even when a fiber has
become embedded in the lung and the scarring process has begun, disabling disease
or death is not inevitable. Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 18 (citing Eagle-Picher, 523 F.
Supp. at 115). The circuit court's conclusion that asbestosis is not inevitable follow-
ing exposure to asbestos appears to be based, at least in part, on Dr. Gee's testimony
in the lower court that over 90% of urban dwellers have some asbestos-related scar-
ring. Only a tiny percentage of these people, however, ever develop clinical asbesto-
sis. Eagle-Picher, 523 F. Supp. at 115.
68. 682 F.2d at 19. The circuit court reasoned that the policies clearly distin-
guished between the event which causes the injury, either an accident or exposure,
and the resulting injury or disease. If the exposure and injury are not simultaneous,
and sub-clinical injury is not an inevitable by-product of exposure, then "resulting
injury" within the meaning of the policies cannot be triggered by exposure to asbes-
tos. See id
Judge Coffin also noted that had the parties intended that a single exposure to
asbestos trigger coverage, the policy language could easily have reflected that intent.
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Furthermore, the First Circuit found that the common, ordinary mean-
ing of the policy language also mandated application of the manifestation
theory.69 Writing for the court, Judge Coffin reasoned that it would be diffi-
cult to consider sub-clinical insults to the lungs as an injury since "injury"
has been generally defined as "something that causes loss, pain, distress or
impairment."'70  The court also decided that to consider the sub-clinical
changes in the body as the occurrence of a disease would be to subvert the
plain meaning of the policy term "disease."
7
'
Having concluded that sub-clinical changes in the lungs were neither
"bodily injury" nor "disease," the First Circuit went on to reason that indi-
vidual health insurance cases which hold that a disease results only when it
becomes "manifest or active" 72 provided support for its view that the plain
meaning of the policy language militated against an exposure interpreta-
If such had been the parties' intention, Liberty Mutual's policies would not have
defined an "occurrence" in part as a "continuous or repeated" exposure to condi-
tions. Id For a discussion of the Liberty Mutual policies' language, see notes 3-4
supra.
69. 682 F.2d at 19. The court relied upon Webster's Dictionary to determine
the plain, ordinary meaning of language in the policies at issue. Id. at 19 (citing
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1966)). The First
Circuit noted that several Ohio courts have relied on Webster's to determine the
meaning of policies brought before them. Id at n.4 (citing Fuerstenburg v. Mowell,
63 Ohio App. 2d 120, 409 N.E.2d 1035, 1036-37 (1978); Olmstead v. Lumberman's
Mutual Ins. Co., 23 Ohio App. 2d 185, 261 N.E.2d 671, 674 (1969), a'd, 22 Ohio St.
2d 212, 259 N.E.2d 123, 126 (1970)). The First Circuit reasoned that where the rele-
vant language is unambiguous and the application of the policy to the relevant facts
is clear, that intent must be ascertained by the plain and ordinary meaning of the
contract language. Id at 17.
70. Id. at 19. The court found that Webster had defined injury to mean "hurt,
damage or loss sustained . . . ." Id (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1966)). Combining the dictionary definition and a lay-
man's view that injury occurs when it impairs his sense of well-being, the circuit court
concluded that sub-clinical insults to the lung do not cause, "loss, pain, distress or
impairment . . . until, or if ever, they become clinically evident or manifest." Id
(citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1966)).
71. Id. at 19-20. The court pointed out that Webster defines "asbestosis" as "a
form of pneumoconiosis." Id at 19 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1966)). This latter term is then defined by Webster as a "disease
of the lungs." Id. The court engaged in the factual presumption that every disease is
preceded by some sub-clinical change in the body. Id. Therefore, the court con-
cluded, to state that disease occurs when sub-clinical alterations take place would be
to subvert the meaning of the term "disease" in the policy because disease does not
inevitably follow from these sub-clinical changes. Id at 19-20.
72. Id. at 20 & n.5. Health insurance policies often require that an illness or
disease originate after a certain date for coverage to ensue. Id Judge Coffin stated
that courts have consistently ruled that disease does not result until it becomes "man-
ifest or active;" however, coverage is not defeated because the disease is latent prior to
the date of coverage. Id (citations omitted).
The court stated that further support for the manifestation theory comes from
courts in some jurisdictions which have concluded that the statute of limitations for
asbestos-related personal injury suits does not begin to run until the disease manifests
itself. Id at n.5 (citations omitted). The court also noted that in at least one work-
men's compensation case, an industrial disease was held to occur when "it manifests
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tion. 73 Concluding that any remaining doubts about the interpretation of
the policies should be resolved in favor of the insured,7 4 the Eagle-Pcher
court decided that the policies' purpose of providing coverage would also be
effectuated by a manifestation trigger of liability.
7 5
On cross-appeal, 76 Eagle-Picher contended that "all insurers on the risk
from the period of initial exposure to the time of manifestation must provide
coverage." 77 This theory of coverage, which had been adopted by the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit in Keene, was rejected by the Eagle-Pcher court. 78
itself." Id (citing Grain Handling Co. v. Sweeney, 102 F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 308 U.S. 570 (1939)).
73. Id at 20. In concluding that various insurance-related cases support a mani-
festation construction, the circuit court found it instructive to refer to language from
an opinion authored by Judge Learned Hand:
Few adults are not diseased, if by that disease one means only that the
seeds of future troubles are not already planted; and it is common place
that health is a constant warfare between the body and its enemies: an
infection mastered, though latent, is no longer a disease, industrially speak-
ing, until the individual's resistance is again so far lowered that he
succumbs.
Id at n.5 (quoting Grain Handling Co. v. Sweeney, 102 F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir.) (L.
Hand, J.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 570 (1939)).
74. Id at 23. Although the First Circuit concluded that the Liberty Mutual and
London Market policies were unambiguous, it found the American Motorists policy
to be susceptible of two plausible readings. Id at 18, 24. Utilizing the principle that
ambiguous policy language should be construed by a court to promote coverage, the
circuit court concluded that a manifestation interpretation was applicable to the
American Motorists policy. Id at 24. While this doctrine of construing ambiguous
language in favor of the insured was the sole basis for its application of the manifesta-
tion theory to the American Motorists' policy, it was but one strand of support for the
First Circuit's application of this theory to the remaining policies. See id at 23-24.
For a discussion of contract principles applicable to ambiguous and unambiguous
insurance policy language, see note 45 supra and notes 93 & 94 infra.
75. 682 F.2d at 23. The circuit court agreed with the district court's contention
that the public policy underpinnings of insurance law support the manifestation the-
ory. Id Judge Coffin reasoned that since Eagle-Picher was uninsured during the
longest period potential plaintiffs were exposed to its asbestos products, and since the
number of asbestos-related claims was accelerating during the policies' period of cov-
erage, "coverage based on manifestation was more desirable than coverage based on
exposure." Id
The court also took notice of an April 1972 agreement between Eagle-Picher
and Liberty Mutual to interpret their policies on a manifestation basis. Id The expo-
sure theorists had contended that this agreement demonstrated that Eagle-Picher
could not have expected coverage on a manifestation basis under their agreements in
the absence of a similar special agreement. Id at 20. The court was not, however,
persuaded by this argument. See id at 23. Instead, the court viewed the 1972 agree-
ment as demonstrating that Eagle-Picher had intended a manifestation approach
once the issue of manifestation versus exposure theories had been raised. Id
76. For a discussion of Eagle-Picher's cross-appeal, see note 16 supra.
77. 682 F.2d at 23. Although Eagle-Picher had argued in the district court for a
manifestation interpretation of the policies, on its cross-appeal it argued that all in-
surers of the risk from the period of initial exposure to the time of manifestation must
provide it with coverage. Id at 16, 23.
78. Id at 23. For a discussion of the decision in Keene, see notes 55-60 and ac-
companying text supra. The First Circuit also refuted the exposure theorists' conten-
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The court, in distinguishing Keene on its facts, reasoned that the insured in
Keene had claimed before the district court that obtaining maximum cover-
age had been its intention. 79 Consequently, the First Circuit reasoned that
the Keene court had simply construed the policies in favor of the insured's
reasonable expectations.8 0  In contrast, the First Circuit found that Eagle-
Picher had no such expectation of maximum coverage because it did not
argue such a theory in the district court.81
Although it affirmed the lower court's decision to embrace the manifes-
tation theory, the circuit court of appeals modified the district court's judg-
ment that the date of diagnosis or the date of death triggers coverage. 82
Noting that a policy of adherence to sound principles of contract construc-
tion outweighs one of fashioning rules of administrative convenience, the
First Circuit stated that "[tlhe policy language clearly required that expo-
sure result in bodily injury during the policy period, not that bodily injury be
medically diagnosed during the policy period."'83 Consequently, the First Cir-
tion that the Sixth Circuit's adoption of the exposure theory in Forty-Eight should be
controlling by distinguishing Forty-Eight on its facts. 682 F.2d at 23 & n.9. In Forty-
Eight, extrinsic evidence of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the poli-
cies tended to show a pattern of prior construction favoring an exposure approach.
Id Unlike Eagle-Picher, Forty-Eight had carried insurance during a substantial pe-
riod of exposure to its asbestos products. Id at 23 n.9. Consequently, the Forty-Eight
court had concluded that an exposure construction would serve to maximize its cov-
erage. Id (citing Forty-Eight, 633 F.2d at 1223). For a discussion of the Forty-Eght
decision, see notes 46-51 and accompanying text supra.
The First Circuit in Eagle-Picher flatly disagreed with the Forty-Eight court's anal-
ysis of relevant policy language and medical evidence. 682 F.2d at 23. However,
Judge Coffin asserted that to the extent that the Forty-Eight court was influenced by
evidence of the parties' intent and by the principle of promoting coverage, it would
have difficulty rejecting the result reached in Eagle-Picher. Id
79. 682 F.2d at 23.
80. Id For a discussion of the rule of insurance policy construction favoring the
expectations of the insured, see note 45 supra.
81. 682 F.2d at 23. Although Judge Coffin agreed with Keene's conclusion that
ambiguity in the insurance agreement should be resolved in favor of the insured, he
emphasized that this principle must not override the court's primary objective of
ascertaining the intention of the parties. Id Judge Coffin therefore concluded that
the Sixth Circuit's statement that a court should "first 'give effect to the policies'
dominant purpose of indemnity' is to weight too heavily apresumed intention to maxi-
mize coverage." Id (citing Keene, 667 F.2d at 1041) (emphasis supplied by court).
82. Id. at 25. Eagle-Picher had also argued that a remand was appropriate so
that the district court could determine the extent of coverage once a policy had been
triggered. Id. at n.12. Eagle-Picher claimed that manifestation of the asbestos-re-
lated disease in one claimant during the policy period should trigger coverage for all
claimants whose disease manifests itself during the policy period. Id However, the
First Circuit decided that such an argument was without merit because the policies
were geared to individual claimants, not to all claimants injured by the same expo-
sure. Id
83. Id at 24. Although the district court had recognized that injury results
when the disease is "capable of diagnosis," it had held that the date of diagnosis, or
death if it occurred prior to diagnosis, triggers coverage in order to ensure that the
availability of coverage could be easily ascertained and demonstrated. Eagle-Picher,
523 F. Supp. at 115, 118. The First Circuit found the district court's goal of adminis-
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cuit concluded that an asbestos-caused disease results under the policies
when it becomes "reasonably capable of diagnosis."
'84
In reviewing the decision in Eagle-Richer, it is submitted that the lan-
guage of the policies at issue, excluding that of American Motorists, 85 man-
dated application of the manifestation theory.86 The language of the
Liberty Mutual and the London Market policies requires that "bodily in-
jury" or "disease" must be caused by an "occurrence." 87 This wording sug-
gests that the "injury or disease" take place at a different point in time than
the "occurrence." 88 Thus, the manifestation theory-which postulates that
trative convenience desirable, but not overriding. 682 F.2d at 24. The circuit court
went on to rule that the existence of clinically evident, diagnosable disease is not
dependent upon actual diagnosis. Id. In so concluding, Judge Coffin asserted that
although the April 1972 agreement between Eagle-Picher and Liberty Mutual re-
ferred to the date of medical diagnosis as the trigger of coverage, the parol evidence
rule would bar the use of such extrinsic evidence to modify the clear terms of inte-
grated agreements which were later entered. Id at 24 n. 11 (citing 3 A. CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 573 (1960); 4 S. WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 631 (3d ed. 1961)). For
a discussion of the Eagle-Picher court's treatment of extrinsic evidence, see notes 63 &
64 and accompanying text supra.
84. 682 F.2d at 25. The First Circuit supported its modification of the lower
court's definition of the manifestation date by citing courts and commentators in
analogous health insurance situations who had reached a similar conclusion: that
disease results "when there is a distinct symptom or condition from which one
learned in medicine can with reasonable accuracy diagnose the disease." Id at 24-25
(citations omitted).
85. For a discussion of the language of the American Motorists policy, see note 6
supra. For a discussion of the First Circuit's rationale for distinguishing between the
two types of policies, see note 65 supra and note 86 and accompanying text infra.
86. See 682 F.2d at 18-21. It is apparent that the First Circuit partially based its
interpretation of the policy terms according to their plain meaning upon the parties'
tacit agreement that the policy language was unambiguous. See id. at 18, 21. Since it
was not argued that the contract language was ambiguous, it can be inferred that the
parties found it to be unambiguous. See id The parties were, however, "diametri-
cally opposed in their reading of what was plainly and clearly stated." Id at 18.
Because the First Circuit concluded that the language of the Liberty Mutual
and London Market policies was unambiguous, its primary focus in interpretation
was upon the precise language used by the parties. Id at 17-21. In comparison, both
the Forty-Eight and Keene courts found similar policy language to be ambiguous, and
therefore applied the canon of construction resolving doubts in favor of maximizing
coverage. See Keene, 667 F.2d at 1041; Forty-Eight, 633 F.2d at 1222. For a discussion
of the legal principles behind these differing theories of construction, see note 45 supra
and notes 93 & 94 infra.
87. 682 F.2d at 17. For a description of the wording of the policies at issue in
Eagle-Picher, see notes 3-8 and accompanying text supra.
88. See 682 F.2d at 18-20; note 71 supra. The First Circuit's conclusion that
"occurrence" and "injury" are separate events under the policies seems based, at least
in part, on the district court's finding that the definitional language explicitly focuses
on the result rather than the cause as the component to which coverage is linked. See
682 F.2d at 19-20. The district court had stated that the time limitation clause "dur-
ing the policy period" always followed the word "results" and was commonly set off
by commas; thus, it had concluded that the time-limiting clause could only modify
the verb "results." Eagle-Picher, 523 F. Supp. at 114.
The First Circuit in Eagle-Picher also stated that the failure of the insurer to
include a provision stating that in cases of insidious disease "bodily injury" will be
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asbestos-related disease results when it becomes clinically evident 89 -is more
consistent with the policy language than is the exposure theory, which hy-
pothesizes that the disease results simultaneously with the exposure.9° Addi-
tionally, since the touchstone of insurance contract construction is the
intention of the parties,9 1 the subsequent construction of the policies on a
manifestation basis by Eagle-Picher and its primary insurer provides strong
support for the court's adoption of the manifestation theory. 92
It is submitted, however, that the Eagle-Pclher court could have reached
a similar result even if it had found the language of the Liberty Mutual and
London Market policies to have been ambiguous. Language of an insurance
contract which is unambiguous should be construed by a court according to
the plain meaning of its terms.93 However, if the language is ambiguous, a
court should generally construe this uncertain language against the insurer
and in favor of the insured.94 It is submitted that although the language of
deemed to be coincident with exposure supported the inference that an exposure
theory was not the intent of the parties. 682 F.2d at 19. However, it is equally plau-
sible that the failure to provide any express requirement that an injury be manifest in
order to trigger coverage may imply that a manifestation trigger was not the intent of
the parties. See Comment, supra note 39, at 685.
89. For a discussion of the manifestation theory, see notes 39, 41 & 42 and ac-
companying text supra.
90. For a discussion of the exposure theory, see notes 40, 43 & 44 and accompan-
ying text supra.
91. 13J. APPLEMAN &J. APPLEMAN, SUpra note 45, § 7385, at 110. If a policy is
unambiguous, a court should construe it without reference to conduct of the parties.
Id at 134. However, if the policy is ambiguous, the court will look to the construc-
tion evidenced by the conduct of the parties acting thereunder, "since such construc-
tion is considered the best evidence of what the contract actually was intended to
mean." Id at 134-35. For a discussion of basic contract principles applicable to
insurance agreements, see note 45 supra.
92. See 682 F.2d at 20, 23. The circuit court took notice of the April 1972 agree-
ment between Eagle-Picher and Liberty Mutual which provided that the parties
would interpret their policies on a manifestation basis. Id. at 23. However, for the
purposes of determining the date of the trigger of coverage, the First Circuit con-
cluded that 1) such agreement could not be used to modify the unambiguous lan-
guage unless it constituted a binding modification or reformation of the prior policies
and 2) the parol evidence rule would bar the use of the 1972 letter to modify the clear
items of the subsequent policies. Id. at 24 n. 11. It would appear that the use of this
document in the interpretation of the policies is inconsistent at best. See note 89
supra.
93. See 682 F.2d at 17. In accordance with principles of insurance law, the First
Circuit combined dictionary definitions of the terms used in the policies with a deter-
mination of how these terms would be used by lay persons. Id at 19. One commen-
tator has suggested, however, that it may be beyond the personal ability of the
layperson to determine when his disease first began. Comment, supra note 39, at 680.
This commentator further noted that some courts alternatively prefer to view the
plain meaning of the policy terms from the vantage point of the insured, or the rea-
sonable expectation of someone standing in the position of the insured, or a reason-
able assessment of the mutual understanding of the parties. Id at 679-80.
For a discussion of the First Circuit's use of dictionary definitions in construing
the terms of the policies at issue, see notes 70 & 71 supra.
94. See 682 F.2d at 23. One commentator has stressed that a liberal construc-
tion rule does not justify departure from the general principles of construction if to do
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the Liberty Mutual and London Market policies may be more clear and
common-sensical than that of the American Motorists policy,95 clarity of the
policy language should not be dispositive on the question of ambiguity.96 It
is suggested that in the latent disease context, the language of both types of
policies yields uncertainty;9 7 therefore, they are "inherently ambiguous"
and, as such, could be construed to promote coverage.98
If the court found these policies to be ambiguous and followed the
above-mentioned principles of contract construction, it is submitted that the
First Circuit would have reached the same manifestation result since the
court noted in its opinion that the manifestation theory would best promote
insurance of Eagle-Picher. 9 9
so would yield an interpretation that changes the meaning of the contract and the
intent of the parties. Comment, supra note 39, at 679. Followed to an extreme, the
doctrine of liberal construction effectively turns a court's inquiry back to its initial
point of departure-namely, the need to define the meaning of the CGL policy and
ascertain the intention or reasonable expectations of the parties. See id at 679. This
theory would appear to support the Eagle-Picher court's emphasis on the intention of
the parties in determining the meaning of the policies at issue. See 682 F.2d at 18, 23.
95. For a description of the language of the policies at issue in Eagle-Picher, see
notes 3 & 4, 6-8, & 35 & 36 and accompanying text supra.
96. See Comment, supra note 39, at 678. Appleman has stated that language "is
ambiguous when its meaning is doubtful" as understood by the ordinary person or
untrained mind. 13 J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, supra note 45, § 7386, at 159. One
commentator has suggested that, "[iln lieu of the rather simple, nontechnical and
straightforward linguistic structure used in the polic[ies] to define 'bodily injury' and
'occurrence,' any argument alleging ambiguity seems dubious." Comment, supra
note 39, at 678. In light of this approach, the distinction drawn by the First Circuit
between the two types of policy language is entitled to some merit. See 682 F.2d at
19-20.
However, a second approach to determine whether ambiguity exists in policy
language has been developed. See Comment, supra note 39, at 678. Under this sec-
ond approach, if the language as applied to a particular set of facts yields uncer-
tainty, this language might be ambiguous. Id at 678-79.
97. See Comment, supra note 39, at 679; Comment, supra note 45, at 256. Some
parties litigating the successive insurer liability issue in cases of insidious disease have,
however, argued that the CGL policy language is ambiguous, while others assert that
it is clear and unambiguous. Id at 677-78. They argue that controversy over the
meaning of this language is insufficient to sustain a finding of ambiguity even though
reasonable minds differ as to when bodily injury occurs within the policy period. Id
at 678. Cf Forty-Ezght, 633 F.2d at 1223 (noting that CGL policy language is at least
somewhat ambiguous because insurance industry is divided between manifestation
and exposure theories).
98. Forty-Eight, 633 F.2d at 1222. See Keene, 667 F.2d at 1041 (the insurance
companies failed to develop policy language that would directly address the full com-
plexity entailed by asbestos-related disease). See also Comment, supra note 30, at 1149
(CGL policy language is ambiguous).
99. See 682 F.2d at 23. The First Circuit noted that since Eagle-Picher was un-
insured for the longest period of exposure to its asbestos products, a manifestation
approach was better for Eagle-Picher than an approach in which coverage is based
on exposure. Id Thus, as an additional strand of support for its holding, the circuit
court agreed with the lower court that a manifestation approach served to maximize
the coverage provided to Eagle-Picher in the underlying lawsuits. Id. Moreover, the
First Circuit stated that even if the terminology of a medical expert were adopted, as
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It is further suggested that, of the two theories, the manifestation theory
is not only more compatible with the language of the Eagle-Picher policies, it
is also more compatible with medical evidence. 100 Yet, while the court's
attempt to construe the policies in light of the most recent medical data on
asbestos-related disease is laudable,' 0 ' it is submitted that neither the mani-
festation nor the exposure theory adequately reflect the cumulative nature of
the disease.' 0 2 Rather than state that asbestos-related injury occurs at a par-
ticular point in time, the Fory-Eight, Porter, and Keene courts, when faced
with the same medical evidence and similar policy language, concluded that
exposure to asbestos starts an injurious process which results in disease. ' 0 3
opposed to that of a layman, the policy language did not support the exposure the-
ory. Id. at 19. See notes 87-90 and accompanying text supra.
100. See 682 F.2d at 18-19. For a discussion of the Eagle-Picher court's reasoning
in concluding that the manifestation theory was more compatible with the most re-
cent medical evidence than the exposure theory, see notes 66-68 and accompanying
text supra.
101. In concluding that exposure and injury are distinguishable, the First Cir-
cuit combined medical testimony to that effect with a legal construct, namely, that a
court should interpret the policy through a plain and clear reading of the policy
language. 682 F.2d at 18-20. One commentator has suggested that forming a nexus
between legal principles and the medical evidence of what is known about the patho-
genesis of an insidious disease is the better method of determining the liability of
insurers in these declaratory judgment actions. Comment, supra note 39, at 693. This
author also suggests that such an analysis would hold more precedential value, since
unlike contract interpretation and varying policy rationales which may vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the medical evidence remains constant. Id
It is noted that at least one United States Circuit Court has accepted the Eagle-
Picher court's interpretation of the medical evidence on asbestos exposure in the con-
text of a statute of limitations dispute. See Neubauer v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas
Corp., 686 F.2d 570, 573 (1982).
102. While both the First Circuit and the lower court found that not every expo-
sure to asbestos fibers results in bodily injury, they nonetheless acknowledged that
asbestosis is a cumulative process beginning with exposure and ending with the mani-
festation of disease or death. 682 F.2d at 18; 523 F. Supp. at 116. However, by
concluding that clinically diagnosable manifestation of asbestosis is the "injury"
which triggers coverage, the First Circuit did not adequately take into account this
medical determination that asbestosis is an ongoing injury to the body. See 682 F.2d
at 18.
103. See Keene, 667 F.2d at 1246; Porter, 641 F.2d at 1133, 1144; Forty-Eight, 633
F.2d at 1214. The Forty-Eight court, based on medical evidence received in the lower
court, concluded that asbestosis is a slowly progressive disease with injury occurring
shortly after initial inhalation of asbestos fibers. 633 F.2d at 1218. The Forty-Eight
court stated that the human lung can absorb a fair amount of asbestos particles with-
out adverse effect. Id at 1214. Further, the Sixth Circuit noted that the testimony of
one doctor revealed that a physician would not regard asbestosis as a disease until
medically diagnosible, whereas an histologist would regard asbestosis as a disease
from the first subclinical change to the body. Id at 1218. Based on evidence virtu-
ally indistinguishable from that reviewed by the Sixth Circuit in Forty-Eight, the Ea-
gle-Picher court favored the manifestation approach over the exposure theory. 682
F.2d at 18-20. For a discussion of the medical evidence adduced in Eagle-Picher, see
notes 66-68 supra. For a discussion of the decision in Forty-Eight, see notes 46-51 and
accompanying text supra.
The Porter court found that "asbestosis is a cumulative and progressive disease."
641 F.2d at 1133. The medical evidence showed that although "each introduction of
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Rather than tailoring its decision to the facts before it,'" 4 it is submitted
that the First Circuit might have adopted a rule of more general applicabil-
ity: the Keene court's multiple trigger theory of coverage. 10 5 The Keene ap-
proach, in addition to closely reflecting medical evidence, ensures certainty
of coverage, and accurately reflects the inherent ambiguity of the CGL pol-
icy language in the asbestos context. Furthermore, if tempered by the re-
quirement that the manufacturer be liable during the period in which it was
insured, 10 6 but before it could no longer obtain coverage,' 0 7 such a theory
fibers into Porter's lungs [constituted] 'bodily injury,' [the injury becomes] cumula-
tive and progressively more harmful to the victim." Id. at 1144. For a discussion of
the decision in Porter, see notes 52-54 and accompanying text supra.
In Keene, the D.C. Circuit recognized that asbestosis is an injurious process be-
ginning with the inhalation of asbestos fibers. 667 F.2d at 1046. For a discussion of
the decision in Keene, see notes 55-60 and accompanying text supra. See also Commer-
cial Union Ins. Co. v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., No. 81-2129, slip op at 22-25 (E.D.
Pa. Dec. 4, 1981) (asbestos diseases are caused by accumulation of asbestos particles
over time; particles accumulated during exposure but prior to manifestation of an
asbestos-related disease are a cause-in-fact of the disease).
104. Both the district and circuit courts restricted their manifestation holding to
claims under the insurance policies at issue. See 682 F.2d at 20-25; 523 F. Supp. at
118.
105. See 667 F.2d at 1042-47. For a discussion of the Keene court's three-pronged
theory of coverage under CGL policies in the asbestos context, see notes 58-60 and
accompanying text supra.
106. Under the majority approach in Keene, Eagle-Picher would be absolved
from any liability despite its.having been uninsured from 1931 to 1968. See Keene, 667
F.2d at 1048 (insured fully indemnified even for period uninsured). See also Eagle-
Picher, 682 F.2d at 16-17 (Eagle-Picher uninsured from 1931 to 1968). To avoid any
inequity in allowing the manufacturer to be exempt from liability for the period for
which it was uninsured, it is suggested that liability should be distributed on a pro
rata basis among insureds and insurers under the multiple trigger theory of Keene.
107. See Keene, 667 F.2d at 1058 (Wald, J., concurring). See also Comment, supra
note 30, at 1168. Judge Wald, in her concurring opinion in Keene, reasoned that the
majority opinion was inconsistent with the reasonable expectations of the parties. See
667 F.2d at 1058 (Wald, J., concurring). If an asbestos manufacturer consciously
decided not to insure itself during particular years of exposure or manifestation, it is
hard to rationalize that its reasonable expectation was -for complete coverage from
any liability resulting from exposure to its products. Id Thus, Judge Wald con-
cluded that to reflect the cumulative nature of asbestos-related diseases, "all those
who voluntarily assumed risk during the period when the diseases progressed must
share the responsibility for the judgment" including self-insurers. Id. Judge Wald's
extension of the Keene theory would not apply to periods when the manufacturer
could no longer obtain coverage. Id.
As applied to Eagle-Picher, the manufacturer would be insured under the Keene
theory, since it held insurance during the injurious process. See td. at 1047. Liability
would in turn have to be allocated between both the insurers whose coverage was
triggered and Eagle-Picher since the manufacturer was uninsured for 37 years of the
injurious process. See id at 1058 (Wald, J., concurring).
One commentator properly asserts that both the hybrid theory of Judge Wald
and that of the majority in Keene are based upon the reasonable expectations of the
parties. Comment, supra note 30, at 1173-74. However, this author speculates that
under Judge Wald's theory, Eagle-Picher's historical pattern of insurance purchases
and the high premiums paid for such insurance indicate a reasonable expectation of
full coverage, and hence a court could determine that no ultimate liability should be
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would provide an administratively tolerable rule' 018 and more fairly appor-
tion liability among those who should indemnify and defend.109
In considering the impact of the Eagle-Picher decision, it is suggested
that judicial reasoning has failed to provide a long-range solution to the
enormous asbestos liability problem."10 It is submitted that the First Circuit
has further frustrated the creation of a uniform rule regarding the events
which trigger coverage under the CGL policies which protect manufacturers
and producers of asbestos. " '1 While the decision in Eagle-Picher reflects judi-
cial sensitivity to the legal and factual issues presented in individual cases, it
also highlights judicial reluctance to adhere to a uniform rule of applicabil-
ity."12 As it now stands, asbestos manufacturers and their insurers can antic-
apportioned to the manufacturer. Id. Since her theory is based on logic and equity, it
would appear that this hypothesis is a logical extension of Judge Wald's theory. See
667 F.2d at 1058 (Wald, J., concurring).
108. In Forty-Eight, it was suggested by both the majority and the dissent that
there is a need for administratively manageable interpretations of CGL policies. See
633 F.2d at 1218. See also id. at 1230-31 (Merritt, J., dissenting) (ten-year rule makes
the discoverability theory both judicially and administratively manageable). In
Keene, it was stated that a more comprehensive definition of injury was needed to
create certainty. 667 F.2d at 1058 (Wald, J., concurring). The proliferation of claims
involving cumulative trauma have underscored the need for an all-encompassing ap-
proach to facilitate the determination of when injury occurs. See Rosow &
Liederman, supra note 33, at 1152; Comment, supra note 38, at 848.
109. The process-oriented definition of injury in Keene "not only provides a flex-
ible formula for adjudicating the legal issues associated with asbestos-related diseases,
but also sets useful precedent for other product-exposure injuries, as of yet unknown
in origin." 667 F.2d at 1058 (Wald, J., concurring). See also Comment, supra note 38,
at 847. In contrast, the exposure theory in itself leaves a manufacturer uncertain as
to future liability for injuries whose development began prior to its being insured,
therein defeating the insured's reasonable expectation of coverage. Keene, 667 F.2d at
1044. The manifestation theory, on the other hand, allows those insurers on the risk
during exposure to the manufacturer's asbestos products to effectively terminate cov-
erage prior to the manifestation of many cases of disease. Id at 1046. This would
deprive the manufacturer of its reasonable expectation of protection. Id.
110. The struggle over liability for asbestos-related claims is by no means short-
lived. Despite the fact that insulation manufacturers have not used asbestos in their
products for the past six or seven years, the problem will be with us for years to come
due to the disease's long latency period and continued exposure to already-in-place
asbestos products. See Mehaffy, supra note 18, at 350. As a result of asbestos expo-
sure, at least 200,000 asbestos-related deaths are predicted by the year 2000. Com-
ment, supra note 38, at 831 (footnote omitted). For a discussion of the flood of
asbestos-related injury claims brought against manufacturers of asbestos, see notes 2
& 28 and accompanying text supra.
11. Since the Eagle-Picher court has held in favor of a manifestation approach,
the Fifth and Sixth Circuits in favor of an exposure approach, and the D.C. Circuit
in favor of the cumulative injury theory, there is no one rule of construction applied
throughout the country. See Eagle-h cher, 682 F.2d 12; Keene, 667 F.2d 1034; Porter,
641 F.2d 1128; Forty-Eight, 633 F.2d 1212.
112. See, e.g., 682 F.2d at 23 & n.9. There has been a tendency of the courts to
distinguish each case on a factual basis. Specifically, they have based their decisions
on prior business dealings in which coverage was based on a manifestation or expo-
sure theory, medical evidence, and the periods of exposure to a manufacturer's prod-
ucts which are covered by insurance. See Oshinsky, supra note 31, at 80-8 1.
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ipate varying approaches to virtually identical issues by the circuit courts of
appeal. 1 3 Judicial disagreement over when insurance coverage is trig-
gered 14 will exacerbate the financial hardships 1 5 to the insurer,1 16 who
113. The circuit courts have suggested that it is desirable to achieve an adminis-
tratively reasonable solution to the flood of litigation. See Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 19
n.3; Keene, 667 F.2d at 1041; Forty-Eight, 633 F.2d at 1218. However, the decision in
Eagle-Picher has now added a third interpretation to the pot ofjudicial solutions. See
note 111 supra.
Without some general court-imposed theory of liability, it is suggested that man-
ufacturers and insurers will be unable to anticipate under which policies they will be
found liable for defense and indemnification of the asbestos manufacturer. Com-
ment, supra note 39, at 692; Comment, supra note 38, at 847. In addition, an insurer
whom the court ultimately deems liable will have been unable to anticipate what
portion of the judgment it may have to pay. Id
Ordinarily, product liability and insurance matters fall within the province of
state courts. Consequently, the Supreme Court is typically reluctant to involve itself.
See Court Refuses to Hear Insurer's Asbestos Pleas, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1982 at DI, D7 col.
1. It has refused to hear arguments in appeals from the decisions in Forty-Eight,
Porter, and Keene. Keene, 667 F.2d 1034, cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1664 (1982); Porter, 641
F.2d 1128, cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 686 (1982); Forty-Eight, 633 F.2d 1212, cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 686 (1981). One result of the Supreme Court's decision not to hear argu-
ment on appeal from the varying circuit court opinions will be that decisions will
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, with the policyholder's rights and the asbestos
victims' chances of recovery being affected by differences in state insurance and con-
tract law. See State-by-State Asbestos Fight Seen in Wake of Court's Move, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 9, 1982, at D7, col. 1.
114. See Ingram, supra note 20, at 317. For a discussion of the judicial disagree-
ment over when insurance is triggered in the asbestos context, see notes 108-11 and
accompanying text supra.
115. Ingram, supra note 20, at 317 n.2. Some economists have stated that the
liability for asbestos-related claims will exceed 38 billion dollars over the next 20
years, more than the combined book value of the major asbestos defendants and 51
insurance companies directly involved in the litigation. State-by-State Asbestos Fight
Seen in the Wake of Court's Move , N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1982, at D7, col. 1. In July 1982,
UNR Industries, Inc. (UNR), an asbestos producer saddled with 12,000 pending as-
bestos claims against it, became the first manufacturer to file for bankruptcy under
Chapter 11 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code. See Kelly, Manvilles Bold Maneuver,
TIME, Sept. 6, 1982, at 17, 18.
In 1982, Manville Corporation, another producer of asbestos products, had
16,500 suits already pending against it, and was being named as defendant in new
cases at a rate of almost 500 per month. Wall St. J., Aug. 27, 1982, at 1, col. 6.
Manville also projected that 52,000 such suits could be filed against it, leading to
potential costs of 2 billion dollars. Id. Since, at that point, its assets would be out-
weighed by its liabilities, Manville sought protection under Chapter 11 of the Federal
Bankruptcy Code. Id. The effect of these Chapter 11 filings is to stay all pending
lawsuits against both Manville and UNR, with the hope that the federal court, with
the aid of UNR's and Manville's creditors, will set up a form of compensation fund
for asbestos victims. Id. at 8, col. 1. Eagle-Picher subsequently released a statement
that it would preserve its $.24 quarterly dividend, and "in no way" was contemplat-
ing Chapter 11 proceedings, but noted that it had cash requirements for asbestos
litigation of over seven million dollars per year. Wall St. J., Aug. 30, 1982 at D3, col.
3. For a discussion of the predicted consequences of the Manville and UNR bank-
ruptcies, see Note, The Manville Bankruptcy. Treating Mass Tort Claims i'n Chapter 11
Proceedings, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1121 (1983); Parnell, Asbestos Bankruptcies. Are They the
Answer?, 12 The Brief 55 (Feb. 1983).
In November 1982, Amatex Corp., a small Pennsylvania manufacturer of asbes-
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must provide a defense and pay judgment costs in the underlying tort ac-
tions, and the manufacturer," 7 who must defend and indemnify if
uninsured.
This uncertainty in the judicial resolution of insurance coverage dis-
putes, coupled with both the refusal of the federal government to accept
liability in asbestos litigation" i8 and the inability of the legal system to han-
dle a mass tort situation, 1 9 will lead asbestos manufacturers and their insur-
ers to look to non-judicial solutions for allocating liability.' 20 One such
tos cloth, became the third asbestos manufacturer to seek protection under Chapter
11 of the bankruptcy code. Philadelphia Inquirer, Nov. 2, 1982, at C1 & C9, cols. 2
& 3.
116. It is suggested that since the insurer is a. profit-making organization, there
is a need for certainty in the resolution of the policy language dispute in order to
enable them to make legitimate forecasts of their needs and hence set their premiums
at a proper level. See Brief for Amicus Curiae, Commercial Union at 14-16, Eagle-
A"her, 682 F.2d at 12. See also Comment, supra note 38, at 832.
It has been suggested that reinsurance or excess insurance companies, which
have a smaller capital base than primary insurers, will face greater hardship than
primary insurers or asbestos manufacturers. See Brief for Amicus Curiae, Commer-
cial Union at 20, Eagle-hcher, 682 F.2d at 12 (citing Reinsurance Association of Amerca,
Reinsurance Underwriting Review, 1980 Premiums and Losses, (1981)). As a result, the via-
bility of excess insurance may begin to collapse as one or more of the secondary
insurers drop off the line due to exhaustion of resources. 'Id
It is noted that Eagle-Picher has commenced a declaratory judgment action to
determine coverage by its intermediate and secondary umbrella policies not adjudi-
cated in Eagle-lficher. See Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Am. Employers Ins. Co., 557 F.
Supp. 225 (1983).
117. Eagle-Picher alleged that, as of the time of trial, it had been named as a
defendant in lawsuits claiming damages in excess of $100 million. Brief for Appellant
Eagle-Picher at 3, Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 12. A recent news article, citing a coali-
tion of asbestos manufacturers, reported that it costs defendant companies an average
of $150,000 to put $28,000 into the hands of a successful claimant, with most of the
difference going into legal fees and expenses. Asbestos Now Company Pen1, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 10, 1982, at D2, col. 1.
118. For a discussion of the federal government's refusal to accept liability in the
litigation against asbestos manufacturers, see note 32 and accompanying text supra.
119. See Vagley & Blanton, supra note 20, at 648. It has been suggested that
latent disease actions, such as those involving asbestos-related disease, may shake the
foundations of this country's tort law. Podgers, supra note 26, at 139. It has been
argued that the tort system has become so oriented toward achieving no-fault com-
pensation that basic principles of justice and equity for parties is no longer possible.
Ward, Coverage for Exposure. Destructive Judicial Legislation, 24 FOR THE DEF. 10, 15
(March 1982). One insurer has suggested that the basic principle underlying tort
law, namely compensating the victim, is not being achieved in a situation where fifty
cents of every claim dollar is spent in the process of arriving at the damage award or
settlement. Brief for Amicus Curiae, Commercial Union at 17-21, Eagle-Picher, 682
F.2d at 12. Further, Commercial Union, as amicus curiae in Eagle-Picher, argued that
the "deep pockets theory"-the theory that the manufacturer is in the best position
to pay monetary relief for damages caused by its products-is negated where the
eventual resources of both manufacturer and insurer are exhausted. See id.
120. Vagley & Blanton, supra note 20, at 656. The Federal government has
reacted to problems within the tort system by issuing a proposed model tort law
specifically recognizing the inherent problems of mass tort litigation and addressing
options such as federal insurance or reinsurance, tax relief permitting reserves for self-
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solution might be an alliance among insurers or the insured. 12 ' Another
would be having the insurance industry redraft the CGL policy to reflect the
exact nature of the injuries covered, and to define the point in time when
such injuries trigger an insurer's liability. 122
Despite Congress' failure to adopt any response to the asbestos contro-
versy,' 2 3 it is submitted that legislative action is appropriate. 12 4 Further, it
insurance and mandatory and voluntary pooling mechanisms. See Model Uniform
Product Liability Act, 43 Fed. Reg. 14,612 (1978). However, in its final form, these
ideas were not adopted under the Model Act. Compare id. with 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714
(1979). It is noted, however, that some heretofore novelljudiial remedies may be
more frequently sought. For example, Johns-Manville has recently filed suit against
the federal government in the United States Court of Claims seeking damages in the
amount of one million dollars for alleged breach of express and implied warranties by
the federal government. Notice from Public Affairs Office, Manville Corp. to Share-
holders, Asbestos, Congress, & You 1, col. 1 (August 1983). The suit is limited to recov-
ery of monies paid by Manville to approximately fifty workers who were found to
have contracted an asbestos-related disease as a result of their exposure to asbestos in
shipyards solely during World War II. Id. For a discussion of prior attempts by
insurance companies and manufacturers of asbestos to recover from the federal gov-
ernment for monies paid to asbestos victims, see note 32 supra.
121. It has been suggested by both insured and insurer groups that a latent
technological injury compensation pool be formed at the state or federal level. See
Comment, Indusit'wide Liability, 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 980, 1002, 1006 (1979). Ad-
ditionally, several defendants in asbestos cases have entered into written contracts
which prohibit one defendant from settling without the approval of the others. Win-
ter, Defendant Asbestos Firms Form an Allance, 68 A.B.A.J. 137 (Feb. 1982). Hoping that
the agreement would provide the basis for a more unified defense and reduce the risk
of one defendant "settling out" on the others, Celotex Corporation, Eagle-Picher,
Keene Corporation, Pittsburgh Corning Corporation and Unarco Industries (UNR)
entered into such a contract. Id The contract stated that the parties would not be
bound by state law regarding their individual shares of liability; instead, each de-
fendant agreed to pay a preset percentage share. Id.
122. Probably as a result of the litigation on asbestos liability, Lloyds of
London, part of the London Market, is currently reviewing its excess coverage policy
language with an eye toward relieving its obligation to abide by the terms and obli-
gations of the primary carrier. Mansfield, supra note 5, at 879. A similar exercise is
being conducted under the auspices of the Insurance Services Office in New York to
study and redraft the standard CGL policy. Id However, while insurers may rewrite
their policies to nullify any result with which they do not agree, such changes operate
prospectively and will not affect the urgency of the financial morass now facing insur-
ers. Ingram, supra note 20, at 360-61.
123. See, e.g., Occupational Health Hazards Compensation Act, H.R. 5735, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); Asbestos Health Hazards Compensation Act, H.R. 5224, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); Asbestos Health Hazards Compensation Act, S. 1643, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); Proposed Amendment to Toxic Substances Control Act, H.R.
6840, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1981); Proposed Amendment to Toxic Substances Control
Act, H.R. 6840, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1981); Asbestos Health Hazards Compensation
Act, S. 2847, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); Asbestos Health Hazards Compensation
Act, H.R. 2740, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); Asbestos Health Hazards Compensation
Act, H.R. 8689, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). For a discussion of the content of, and
differences between, the three major bills proposed in 1981 and 1982 by Senator
Hart, former Fepresentative Fenwick, and Representative Miller, see Comment, supra
note 21, at 186-90.
Although attempts at legislating a resolution to the asbestos problem have not
been successful to date, Congress was successful in creating a comprehensive compen-
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is urged that the ninety-eighth Congress give asbestos legislation the atten-
tion it deserves and adopt a comprehensive plan which will not only provide
relief to asbestos victims, but also reduce the spectre of financial ruin in the
asbestos and insurance industries.
1 25
Mark C Levy
sation system for miners afflicted with black lung disease. See Black Lung Benefits
Act of 1972, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-45 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Despite the success of the
1972 Act in treating these victims of pneumoconiosis, one commentator has criticized
the program for creating legal presumptions of disease which frequently led to pay-
ment of benefits to some who were not entitled to them. See Comment, supra, at 191
(citing Solomons, A Crtical Analysts of the Legislative History Surrounding the Black Lung
Intenrm presumption and a Survey of it's Unresolved Issue, 83 W. VA. L. REV. 869 (1981)).
124. See Forty-Eight, 663 F.2d at 1229 (Meritt, J., dissenting). One commentator
has stated, "If the purpose of the legal system is to give the citizen a sufficient cushion
against major disaster, we are faced not with questions of corrective justice in the
individual case, but of basic taxing policy . . . [Tihese questions like taxing ques-
tions, should be addressed by the legislature, where the interdependence and coordi-
nation of many distinct benefit programs can receive comprehensive scrutiny."
Epstein, Products Li'ability. The Gathering Storm, 1 REG. 15-16, 19-20 (Sept./Oct. 1977).
125. See Comment, supra note 21, at 179, 200. See also note 115supra. One com-
mentator has suggested that an appropriate comprehensive plan to aid asbestos vic-
tims may be achieved by combining elements of the Hart, Fenwick and Miller bills
proposed during the Ninety-seventh Congress. Comment, supra at 191. This com-
mentator suggests that in order to achieve a successful legislative resolution of the
asbestos and latent disease crisis, any bill which is adopted must include the following
items: 1) an eligibility requirement determined by direct medical evidence of latent
disease; 2) a provision mandating contribution to the compensation fund by the fed-
eral government and the tobacco industry (based on medical findings that cigarette
smoking increases risk of lung cancer in asbestos workers); 3) a provision mandating
payment by each responsible party, including the federal government, of administra-
tive costs based on its percentage of responsibility, 4) a provision terminating the
asbestos litigation pending at the time of the bill's enactment; and 5) language flex-
ible enough to include other occupational diseases arising in the future. See id at
191-200.
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